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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEXTUALISM AND THE MODERN EXPLANATORY STATUTE
ADAM CREWS*
ABSTRACT
The explanatory statute is a largely forgotten legislative tool. Once common,
the explanatory statute was a retrospective act that identified an ambiguity or
erroneous interpretation of a prior law and then directed the legislature’s view
of the correct interpretation.
Although now rare, the explanatory statute is not dead. Just a few years ago,
Congress enacted an amendment to Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act—a now hotly contested topic—with the hallmarks of an
explanatory statute. In the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”), Congress concluded that courts had overextended Section 230 immunity to preclude claims by sex trafficking victims and
clarified that the immunity should not be construed to impair those claims. So
far, however, courts and commentators have taken a narrow view of FOSTA and
assumed that it preserves only those claims specifically enumerated in the
statute.
This view proceeds from an underappreciation for explanatory statutes and
their proper application. Indeed, given their rarity, little has been written about
how to approach statutes of this sort under the now-prevailing textualist
methodology. This Article aims to fill that gap by proposing a generally
applicable textualist approach to analyzing modern explanatory statutes. When
applied to FOSTA, that approach yields a perhaps surprising result: A sound,
textualist reading of FOSTA may invite federal courts to recalibrate the scope
of Section 230 immunity, even outside the context of sex trafficking claims.

* American Bar Association Administrative Law Fellow and Appellate Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission. All views in this Article are expressed in a personal capacity and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States, my agency employer, or any FCC
commissioner. I am grateful to the Hon. T.S. Ellis, III, author of the original Zeran decision, for
training me to be a better interpreter of legal texts. My thanks and appreciation to Patrick Ganninger
and the other editors at the Saint Louis University Law Journal for providing thorough and helpful
comments and edits.
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INTRODUCTION
A recurring problem in statutory interpretation is how best to avoid
mismatches between the legislature’s intended meaning and the interpreted
meaning of statutory language over the mine run of cases. 1 We often think about
this problem in terms of the tools and techniques that lawyers and judges use to
divine meaning. But legislators, too, have tools to bridge the divide between
what they mean to say and how judges understand and apply the words enacted. 2
For example, a legal text might contain specific definitions that tell courts the
scope of key terms or phrases, 3 or it might include a specific rule of construction
telling courts to avoid certain outcomes. 4 These directives are often course
setting; they tell interpreters how to understand and to apply the text at the outset.
But what if a legislature realizes the need for guidance only after courts have
begun applying the statute in a way the legislature never intended? That situation
calls for a course correcting tool that gets interpreters back on the path that the
enacting legislature tried to set (or, perhaps more accurately, that the subsequent
legislature thinks that the enacting legislature tried to set). One option is to start
fresh; a legislature could repeal the old statute and replace it with new and clearer
language that courts must apply going forward. If the legislature prefers a scalpel
to a saw, it might instead just amend the old statute to clarify the applicable rule
and perhaps even make clear in the text its disapproval of the rule announced in
a specific case. 5 But that might work only if there is one particular case at the
heart of the problem; it is perhaps less effective if the problem is an entire line
of cases entrenching a particular view. That latter situation may call for a

1. See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 4 (2011) (identifying resolution of this
problem as “one of the criteria by which many people evaluate proposed techniques of statutory
interpretation”).
2. This author focuses on “legislators” even though the same principle applies to executive
officials who can enact directives with the force of law. This under-inclusive term is used rather
than the broader term “lawmakers” because the latter may be over-inclusive, to the extent some
might understand it to include judicial officers that, on some accounts, “make” law. See Jack G.
Day, Why Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 563, 565 (1976).
3. See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 129–30 (2008) (stating that statutory
definitions generally control the meaning of statutory terms); NELSON, supra note 1, at 554–56
(discussing the theory of statutory definitions).
4. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as
to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII
(“This amendment shall not be construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen
before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”).
5. E.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. §§ 2(1), 3–4, 123
Stat. 5 (amending an earlier statute and expressly disapproving of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)); see generally Pat McDonnell, Note, The Doctrine of
Clarifications, 119 MICH. L. REV. 797 (2020) (exploring how courts and legislatures approach
clarifications to existing law).
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different form of course correction—including, perhaps, an “explanatory
statute.” 6
Broadly speaking, that final option is this Article’s subject. Historically, a
legislature would enact an explanatory statute to offer a clarification,
explanation, or rule of construction telling courts to apply, or to refrain from
applying, pre-existing law in a particular way. These statutes varied in their
particulars, but certain features were typical: (1) a legislative acknowledgement
of doubt about proper meaning or error in prior interpretations; (2) language of
declaration or explanation, or a rule for how to construe (or not to construe) some
earlier law; and (3) an indication of retrospective application. 7
Although explanatory statutes are no longer common in the United States, 8
they have a long history in the Anglo-American legal tradition. On this side of
the Atlantic, that history has not always been one of positive reception in the
courts. Unlike in England, various and important written constitutional rules
constrain American legislatures. 9 So, some courts in this country have regarded
explanatory statutes with disfavor, concluding that they contravene these rules
by intruding on judicial power or impermissibly affecting vested rights. 10
But explanatory statutes are not completely gone. Just a few years ago,
Congress enacted one in a hotly contested area: Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act. 11 In general, Section 230 immunizes interactive

6. See James E. Pfander, History and State Suitability: An “Explanatory” Account of the
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1323 (1998). These statutes are also sometimes
called “declaratory” or “expository.” See id. at 1314–15. For simplicity, this Article uses
“explanatory” as a catch-all term except when discussing a specific source’s use of an alternative
term.
7. See id. at 1319 (identifying these common features).
8. See id. at 1314 (observing that explanatory statutes “have largely disappeared from the
repertoire of the modern American legislative assembly”); Note, Declaratory Legislation, 49
HARV. L. REV. 137, 143 (1935) (observing, in the early twentieth century, “the decreasing number
of such laws . . . in favor of the far more satisfactory simple amendment”).
9. “England” is used rather than “the United Kingdom” because, in discussing how America
inherited explanatory statutes, this Article focuses principally on legal traditions that developed
prior to the modern United Kingdom’s emergence. See generally infra Part I.A.
10. See generally infra Part I.B.
11. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230’s scope is “currently a matter of substantial debate.”
William P. Marshall, Internet Service Provider Liability for Disseminating False Information about
Voting Requirements, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 669, 694 n.146 (2020) (canvassing various recent
proposals). “Interested stakeholders are now regularly debating the merits of changes to Section
230 in industry conferences, online, and in the national news media.” Ryan Mrazik & Natasha
Amlani, Section 230: A Law on the Cusp of Change?, 35 ANTITRUST 26, 26 (2020). And Section
230 has caught the eye of political leaders, too. See, e.g., George Fishback, How the Wolf of Wall
Street Shaped the Internet: A Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 28 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 275, 276–77, 291–93 (2020) (assessing comments and proposals by federal
legislators).
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computer service providers from state and federal liability in some instances. 12
Most importantly, Section 230(c)(1) states: “No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” 13 Although
there are prominent textualist detractors, 14 many federal circuit courts read
Section 230(c)(1) to provide websites with broad immunity from all “lawsuits
seeking to hold [them] liable for [the] exercise of a publisher’s traditional
editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content.” 15 As an example of this breadth, courts have applied Section
230(c)(1) immunity to shield from liability websites that facilitate erotic
services, 16 including a website alleged to have deliberately “structur[ed]” its
services “to facilitate sex trafficking.” 17
Congress recently reacted to cases like these by enacting the Allow States
and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”). 18 In
relevant part, FOSTA amended Section 230 by identifying three classes of sex
trafficking claims that, in general, Section 230 should not “be construed to
impair or limit.” 19 Legislators, courts, and commentators have described this

12. See generally infra Part II.A.1.
13. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
14. See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 13, 15 (2020)
(Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (questioning the majority view of Section 230
immunity); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (same).
15. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Almeida v. Amazon,
Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases following this view). The immunity
technically applies to an “interactive computer service,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which means “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or education
institutions,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). “Website” is used for simplicity because (1) “the most common
interactive computer services are websites,” Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and (2) this Article
focuses on an explanatory statute addressed to litigation against a specific website. See generally
infra Part II.B.
16. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 961, 967–69 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
17. See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016).
18. Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018); see generally infra Part II.B.1.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5); see Eric Goldman, The Complicated Story of FOSTA and Section
230, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 279, 284 (2018) (describing FOSTA’s “six main provisions”).
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amendment as a “carve out,” 20 “statutory exception[],” 21 “exclusion,” 22 or
“remov[al]” 23 of immunity for the covered sex trafficking claims. Although
FOSTA necessarily withdraws Section 230(c)(1) immunity from those claims,
the narrow focus on the enumerated sex trafficking claims glosses over the
potential significance of Congress’s specific instruction that Section 230 “shall
be construed” in a particular way. 24 That is not traditional carve-out language; it
is the language of an explanatory statute. And, given recent criticism of the
current state of Section 230(c)(1) immunity, 25 understanding FOSTA as an
explanatory statute may invite serious rethinking of how courts read and apply
Section 230(c)(1) in any context.
That issue is at the heart of this Article. Because explanatory statutes have
fallen out of widespread use in modern U.S. legislatures, 26 not much has been
said about how these statutes fit into the now-prevailing textualist approach to
statutory interpretation. 27 This Article aims to fill that void. Using FOSTA as
focal point, this Article develops a textualist approach to modern explanatory
statutes. Thus, this Article aims to contribute to legal discourse at both a macro
and micro level: In addition to proposing a generally applicable textualist
approach to applying any modern explanatory statute, 28 this Article analyzes
how FOSTA’s explanatory amendment should apply in particular, and in doing
so questions the assumption that FOSTA preserves only a narrow set of claims. 29

20. See J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, LLC, No. 19-cv-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 20, 2020); H.R. REP. NO. 115-572(I), at 9, 10 (2018); Michael A. Cheah, Essay, Section
230 and the Twitter Presidency, 115 N.W.U. L. REV. ONLINE 192, 196 n.23 (2020); Lucy Wiesner,
Note, Good Intentions and Unintended Consequences: SESTA/FOSTA’s First Two Years, 93 TEMP.
L. REV. 151, 162 (2020).
21. See David Sloss, Section 230 and the Duty to Prevent Mass Atrocities, 52 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 199, 200 (2020).
22. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 284.
23. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2046 n.150
(2018); Emily J. Born, Note, Too Far and Not Far Enough: Understanding the Impact of FOSTA,
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1633 (2019).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).
25. See, e.g., Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 13, 15
(2020) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (questioning the prevailing view in the federal
courts of appeals); Marshall, supra note 11, at 694 n.146 (surveying proposals for change); Adam
Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: Common Carriage, Network Neutrality, and Section 230,
22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 391, 429 (2020) (criticizing cases in which the author claims that Section
230(c)(1) immunity placed websites “above the law”).
26. See sources cited supra note 8.
27. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 265
(2020) (observing that “textualism has in recent decades gained considerable prominence within
the federal judiciary”).
28. See generally infra Part III.
29. See generally infra Part IV.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2022]

TEXTUALISM AND THE MODERN EXPLANATORY STATUTE

203

The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sets the stage for discussing
explanatory statutes by tracing the theory and practice of legislative explanation
from its birth in medieval England to its reception in the United States before
and after the Founding. Part II then focuses on FOSTA. After providing a highlevel overview of debates about Section 230(c)(1) immunity, Part II describes
Congress’s explanation for how that immunity applies to sex trafficking claims
and how courts have begun to interpret and to apply that explanation. Part III
then draws on textualist literature and historical practice to advance a textualist
approach to understanding and applying modern explanatory statutes. Part IV
then explains how that approach informs FOSTA’s amendment to Section 230,
including by inviting lower courts to rethink their current views on the scope of
Section 230(c)(1) immunity.
I. THE EXPLANATORY STATUTE IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION
Legislative explanation of pre-existing law—including via an explanatory
statute—has a rich history in the Anglo-American legal tradition. This history
matters. A legislature’s choice among several ways to express a rule is
consequential because how a legislature drafts a statute can inform the meaning
we take from it. 30 Where a legislature chooses to draft a statute in light of settled
history or practice, interpreters can fairly assume that the legislature chose that
course for a particular reason, e.g., with the assumption that courts will read and
apply the new statute in the same way they have read and applied similarly
drafted statutes in the past. 31
This Part first discusses the evolution of extra-judicial interpretation and
explanation in England, with emphasis on the legal traditions that evolved from
the later medieval period onward. 32 This Part then explores how explanatory

30. Cf., e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–89 (2001) (reasoning that a legislative
choice not to express a cause of action counsels against implying one); McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991) (reasoning that Congress’s choice of judicial review language
from among different options informs the scope of review that Congress chose); O’Connor v.
Oakhurst Dairy, 851 F.3d 69, 73, 75 (1st Cir. 2017) (using a legislature’s drafting manual to discern
the legislature’s intent in drafting a statute a particular way).
31. Cf., e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 621–23 (2011) (plurality opinion)
(reasoning that the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause reflects an established Founding-era drafting
technique that informs the Clause’s meaning and operation (citing and applying Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 237–240, 242 (2000) [hereinafter Nelson, Preemption]));
McNary, 498 U.S. at 496 (“It is presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic
rules of statutory construction[.]”); McDonnell, supra note 5, at 824 (noting that “[s]tatutory
interpretation is sometimes thought of as a conversation between legislatures and courts”).
32. “Extra-judicial” is used to mean outside the context of deciding a case or controversy. So,
although Parliament was for centuries the “highest and greatest” court in England, and therefore
judicial in character, this author treats Parliament’s exposition of existing law via explanatory
statutes as extra-judicial. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as
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statutes were used in early America, including the adoption of explanatory
language in the Eleventh Amendment and the steady emergence of judicial
hostility to certain of these statutes. This historical discussion serves two
purposes. First, it demonstrates that constitutional principles limit, but do not
eliminate, the explanatory statute in America. Second, it shows how and when
those statutes fell out of favor, which in turn explains why lawyers, legislators,
and judges may be less familiar with the tool today than in centuries past. In
short, this Part aims to show that extra-judicial exposition of the law via
explanatory statutes is sometimes a legitimate tool for American legislatures and
one with an established interpretative history on which courts can draw when
applying new explanatory statutes.
A.

Extra-Judicial Exposition in England

To understand the explanatory statute, we need to start in medieval England.
There, extra-judicial exposition was uncontroversial because of the historical
English relationship between making and interpreting law. The explanatory
statute was a logical outgrowth of actors’ and institutions’ sharing roles and
powers that modern Americans are accustomed to seeing separated. In
particular, the unity of legislative and judicial power—as well as the overlap
between legislative and judicial officers—fostered a legal environment in which
extra-judicial exposition was the norm.
To begin, consider the historical relationship between legislation and the
King in medieval England. For many centuries, both before and after the
Norman Conquest, legislating was the project of the King and his close advisors,
with no necessary connection to what we would today describe as a
“legislature.” 33 Simply put, a statute was “something established by royal
authority,” with any involvement by advisors or a Parliament “completely
immaterial.” 34

Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1729 (2012) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *160, 161).
33. See THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 321–22
(1956); see also THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (2d ed.
John Norton Pomeroy 1874). Note that several contemporary scholars routinely draw on Professor
Plucknett’s work as authoritative on issues of legal history in medieval England. See generally,
e.g., Thomas Lund, Activist Judges of the Early Fourteenth Century, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 471
(routinely citing Professor Plucknett’s works); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30–48 (2001) (same) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute];
Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 SYR. L.
REV. 1 (1998) (same).
34. PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 322.
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Over time, Parliament came to play a larger role in legislation. Importantly,
however, Parliament’s main job was initially “the administration of the law.” 35
In this legal tradition, law was “unwritten and unrecorded, living in custom and
usage, and not gathered from volumes or parchments.” 36 Instead, Parliament
“ascertained” the law “from the testimony of the judges or representatives of the
Community” and reduced the law to writing when necessary. 37 Even when the
fourteenth century saw the rise of “parliamentary legislation,” it did not involve
lawmaking as we think of it today. 38 Instead, the King used Parliament to give
authority to his own decrees, which—like the legislation of centuries past—were
formed in the King’s council of close advisors. 39
Eventually, however, Parliament began to suggest amendments to the
existing law. 40 At first, Parliament might merely petition the King for legislation
to address some problem, which sometimes (but not always) led to statutes
drawn up by judges to provide a solution. 41 But it was not until the fifteenth
century that Parliament began to act like a modern legislature, presenting bills
with particular words proposed to be enacted as statutes. 42
Early approaches to statutory interpretation developed against this
backdrop. Into the fourteenth century, Anglo legal thought did not generally
recognize any division between law-making and law-interpreting. 43 The English
system instead recognized the maxim ejus est interpretari cujus est condere,
meaning that whoever is authorized to establish the law is authorized to interpret
it. 44 Thus, the King initially resolved interpretative disputes himself. 45 King

35. FRANCIS PALGRAVE, 1 THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH COMMONWEALTH 127
(1832).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 323.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. (noting that the government sometimes “failed to act at all upon a petition” and
sometimes “legislated along different lines, of which [the House of Commons] did not approve”);
SEDGWICK, supra note 33, at 21 (noting the role of judges in drafting the statutes); Manning, Equity
of the Statute, supra note 33, at 47–48 (“[T]o the extent that early Commons secured an essential
role in the enactment of statutes, they did so by petitioning the Crown for legislation.”).
42. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 323–24.
43. See id. at 328; Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 30 (noting a “school of
thought contend[ing] that no meaningful concept of statutory interpretation . . . emerged until
lawmaking and interpretation began to separate from each other in fifteenth-century England”).
44. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 328–329 (providing the maxim); Michel Troper,
Constitutional Interpretation, 39 ISR. L. REV. 35, 38 n.6 (2006) (translating the maxim). The maxim
that the lawmaker is also the law-interpreter perseveres in some civil law systems to this day. See
Matthew Robinson, Note, Deferring to Congressional Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutory
Provisions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 565, 569 (2013).
45. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 329.
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Henry III, for example, once decreed that “that the interpretation of laws and
customs belongs to us and our nobles, and none other.” 46
Given this tradition, the English courts historically resolved questions of
interpretation by referring to the legislator. 47 And often, the judges themselves
had participated in drafting the statutes at issue. 48 In that respect, the act of
interpretation was little more than the act of explaining the judge’s own policy. 49
Given this conflation of the lawmaking and interpreting roles, there was no need
for a theory of interpretation. 50 In fact, the very concept of interpretation
“connoted . . . fraud or evasion” until the late middle ages. 51 It was not until the
mid-fourteenth century that judges were separated enough from the lawmaking
function that they began to “treat legislation as the product of an alien body, of
which they know nothing save from the words of the statute itself,” and therefore
concluded “that wording alone” supplied the legislature’s intention. 52
As Parliament’s legislative power grew, so did its own role in interpretation.
Parliament was not only a legislature, but the “highest and greatest” court in
England, with power to make law and to “expound[]” the law through
declaratory acts. 53 So, yet again, the overlap between legislative power and
judicial power made extra-judicial explanation or exposition of the law
uncontroversial. But beyond the overlap of power, there was again an overlap of
roles. Beginning in the fourteenth century, the House of Lords began
accumulating judicial power in relation to royal officers and other judges,
ultimately obtaining appellate jurisdiction over the common law courts. 54 “In
46. Id. (quoting 10 CLOSE ROLLS OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III (A.D. 1256–1259) 489 (1932)).
47. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 329.
48. See id. at 330–31 (“While legislation was the work of a very small group of judges and
councillors [sic] in close contact with the King, recourse to the same small group was easy when
an interpretation was desired. . . . [T]he legislature and the judiciary did actually have a common
membership in the thirteenth century, and so nothing was more natural than to allow the judges
considerable latitude in the reign of Edward I and even his son, for they were intimately connected
with the group which in fact drew up the statutes. . . . In short, the court was well aware of the
intention of a statute because the judges had had the biggest share in making it.”); Manning, Equity
of the Statute, supra note 33, at 40-41 (“Common law judges not only adjudicated cases, but also
drafted or, as the fourteenth century wore on, at least assisted in drafting statutes.”); M.B.W.
Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 299, 301 & n.9 (1997) (“In England, through the
fourteenth century at least, both the enactment and application of statutes fell to the same people.”).
49. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 331.
50. Cf. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 31 & n.130 (noting that “early judges
likely felt little need” to offer “any formal justification” for their interpretative practices).
51. PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 328.
52. Id. at 332.
53. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 32, at 1729 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *160, 161); see also Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 41 (“An
emergent Parliament exercised what we would think of as legislative powers, but also functioned
as the highest common law court in England and was known as the High Court of Parliament.”).
54. See Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 44–45.
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practice, this meant that the ultimate authority to interpret statutes resided in a
body that shared responsibility for their enactment.” 55
Explanatory statutes evolved in this centuries-long tradition. Reaching back
to the thirteenth century, certain extra-judicial explanations looked like standalone legislation. In 1278, for example, “certain Expositions” were made “by the
King and his Justices” to the Statute of Gloucester, with the expositions
published much like a statute. 56 But not every explanatory statute necessarily
resolved an ambiguity. Sometimes, an explanatory statute might do what we
would today call gap filling—providing a specific rule where before there was
only a more general standard. Consider an explanatory statute from the late
1600s dealing with the settlement of the poor. 57 In 1662, an initial Act provided
a process for removing “the Poore” from a parish where they settled to “where
he or they were last legally settled.” 58 The process required a complaint to a
Justice of Peace “within Forty dayes” of settlement in a new parish. 59 Decades
later, an explanatory statute added that “the Forty days continuance . . . shall be
accounted from the Publication of a Notice in Writing,” subject to various rules
and regulations. 60 This was not so much a clarification of ambiguity as the
resolution of vagueness through the addition of detail that would guide judges.
But whether resolving ambiguity or vagueness, well into the 1700s it was
accepted English practice that legislators “‘best knew their own Sense and
Meaning’” and so “could enact explanatory statutes ‘to direct and guide the
Judges.’” 61
*

*

*

As this history shows, statutes denominated as declaratory, explanatory, or
expository may have played several different roles in England, particularly over
time. By contrast to statutes that create new law, the historical view was that
explanatory or declaratory acts reduced to writing what the law already is. 62 In
earlier days, when Parliament’s primary role was to ascertain the law, 63 a
declaratory act might reduce to writing an old or disputed custom and thereby
55. Id. at 46.
56. See Exposition of the Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 13–15, 50, in 1 THE
STATUTES OF THE REALM (1965 ed.).
57. See An Act for the better Explanation and supplying the Defects of the former Laws for
the Settlement of the Poor, 1691, 3 W. & M., c. 11, § 2.
58. See An Act for the better Releife of the Poore of this Kingdom, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. II, c.
12, § 1.
59. See id.
60. 3 W. & M., c. 11, § 2.
61. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE
L.J. 908, 938 (2017) (quoting WILLIAM PEYT, JUS PARLIAMENTARIUM 57 (2d ed. 1741)).
62. See SEDGWICK, supra note 33, at 28.
63. See PALGRAVE, supra note 35, at 127.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

208

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:197

declare both what the law is and what it “ever hath been.” 64 With the rise of
legislation as we think of it today—i.e., creating new positive law—explanatory
statutes took on a new role: “to explain doubts in previous statutory
provisions” 65 and “‘to direct and guide the Judges’” in applying those
provisions. 66 In whatever role or form, however, extra-judicial explanations
were well accepted because they came from the same officials charged with
making law in the first instance—whether the King after the Norman Conquest,
his judges and advisors through the fourteenth century, or Parliament and the
House of Lords as the centuries wore on.
B.

The Explanatory Statute in the United States

The early American Republic inherited explanatory statutes from England.
Like Parliament, many colonial and early state legislatures could pass
explanatory or declaratory acts. 67 That inheritance is unsurprising: “American
institutions and constitutional law continued to be intimately tied to English
constitutionalism” in the early Republic, with institutions at the state and federal
levels imitating and relying on English institutions and law for guidance and
precedent. 68
In this period—i.e., before the Constitution’s ratification—“ideas of
legislative supremacy flourished,” and a robust legislative role in explaining or
declaring the law was no less acceptable in America than it was in England. 69
As Professor Pfander has catalogued, explanatory statutes were “relatively
common during the 1770s and 1780s,” with examples appearing in Georgia,
New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. 70 From this survey of

64. See SEDGWICK, supra note 33, at 29; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *86; see
also, e.g., Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 46 (noting “a lingering sense that
statutes were useful principally as a means to declare or improve the effectiveness of customary
law, rather than as a form of positive lawmaking in the modern sense”); cf. John F. Stinneford,
Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 531, 573–74 (2014) (noting
the traditional view that because a declaratory statute “purports to say what the custom of the realm
is, it may be voided if the evidence shows that the actual custom is contrary to the statute”).
65. See SEDGWICK, supra note 33, at 29.
66. See Bamzai, supra note 61, at 938 (quoting WILLIAM PEYT, JUS PARLIAMENTARIUM 55
(2d ed. 1741)).
67. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 32, at 1749.
68. See Kate Elizabeth Brown, Rethinking People v. Croswell: Alexander Hamilton and the
Nature and Scope of “Common Law” in the Early Republic, 32 L. & HIST. REV. 611, 631 (2014);
accord, e.g., Pfander, supra note 6, at 1318 & n.222 (collecting authority on “the tendency of the
colonial assemblies to model themselves on the precedents of Parliament” to explain how the
concept of Parliamentary supremacy made its way to the North American British colonies).
69. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1318–19; see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 77–78 (2005) (discussing legislative supremacy in state constitutions in this
period).
70. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1319–20 & n.229–33.
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Founding-era explanatory statutes, Professor Pfander identified three common
features: (1) “titles or descriptions containing language of explanation,
declaration, or construction,” including in “many instances” a declaration “that
a previous law shall (or shall not) be construed in a particular matter”; (2) “a
preamble” or other statement acknowledging “the existence of doubt or
confusion in the current state of the law” necessitating “a legislative fix”; and
(3) an indication that they “operate retrospectively by providing a rule of judicial
construction in the resolution of past or pending cases.” 71
Yet, this inherited role for legislatures in explaining the law did not
necessarily fit comfortably with the Founding generation’s new conceptions of
government. For one, a strict separation of the judicial from the legislative
power 72—”a novelty of American constitutionalism” 73—undermined one of the
bases that traditionally justified Parliament’s role in explaining the law, namely
its position as the highest court in England. 74 Other innovative constitutional
ideas (at both the state and federal levels) furthered the erosion of legislative
supremacy—ideas like including popular sovereignty, 75 due process, 76 and
protections against impairment of contracts or retroactive laws. 77
Nevertheless, explanatory statutes persisted for some time after the
Constitution’s adoption. 78 Consider an example from New Jersey. In its 1776
constitution, New Jersey extended the franchise without regard to race or sex. 79

71. Id. at 1319.
72. Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting the legislative power of the United States
in Congress) with, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power of the United States in
one Supreme Court and inferior federal courts).
73. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 32, at 1729.
74. See id. at 1729–30 (discussing the shift away from unified legislative and judicial power
in the early Republic); Pfander, supra note 6, at 1318–19 (arguing that “the leaning of state
governments in the direction of legislative supremacy did not long appeal to the Founding
Generation; they instituted reforms with a series of new constitutions that . . . sought to exclude
legislative assemblies from the exercise of judicial powers”); cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 69, at 77–
78 (chronicling the division of powers and the “increase[]” of “[j]udicial power . . . at the expense
of the legislature”); Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 56–59 (arguing that certain
of the Constitution’s structural features undermine resort to certain English interpretative methods);
Declaratory Legislation, supra note 8, at 138 (contrasting how American and English courts treat
explanatory statutes, noting that the latter courts are “unhampered by constitutional restrictions”).
75. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. preamble; Pfander, supra note 6, at 1319 (identifying popular
sovereignty as eroding legislative supremacy). For a general discussion of the constitutional
significance of popular sovereignty in the early Republic, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 10–21 (2005).
76. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2; Declaratory Legislation, supra note 8, at 139.
77. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Declaratory Legislation, supra
note 8, at 139.
78. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1319.
79. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 69, at 72; Charles H. Wesley, Negro Suffrage in the Period of
Constitution-Making, 1787–1865, 32 J. NEGRO HIST. 143, 161 (1947).
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But, in an example of supposed legislative supremacy, the New Jersey
legislature purported to put on a gloss on that text via explanatory statute in
1807. 80 After reciting via preamble the need “to clear up . . . doubts,” the act
professed to be “declaratory of the true sense and meaning of the Constitution”
in limiting the franchise to “free, white male citizen[s].” 81 And New Jersey was
not alone; other examples of explanatory and declaratory acts abound in the postratification period, notwithstanding America’s state- and federal-level
constitutional innovations. 82
Legislative explanations were not necessarily particular to statutes. As
Professor Pfander has argued, the Eleventh Amendment is best understood as a
type of explanatory enactment designed to restate the pre-existing law after the
Supreme Court misconstrued its power under Article III of the Constitution. 83
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 84 the Supreme Court read its jurisdiction over stateparty cases to extend to suits by individuals brought against states in their
corporate capacities. 85 In response, Congress proposed and the States ratified the
Eleventh Amendment, an explanatory instrument directing that the judicial
power of the United States “shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”86 This
language of construction was one of the hallmarks of an explanatory statute. 87
And the Eleventh Amendment is not necessarily alone in reflecting the
explanatory and declaratory tradition; others have suggested that the Second and

80. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws:
An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 502 (1998) (citing, for example, Charles H. Wesley,
Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787–1865, 32 J. NEGRO HIST. 143, 161
(1947)).
81. Wesley, supra note 79, at 161.
82. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 68, at 631 & n.55 (discussing an 1805 New York statute
declaring the common law of libel); Pfander, supra note 6, at 1316 (discussing a 1799 North
Carolina statute purporting to explain an earlier 1789 act); cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 69, at 77
(“State constitutions reflected the theories of the day on separation of powers, and on checks and
balances.”).
83. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1323–52. For endorsements of this view, see, e.g., Bradford
R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1896–
97 (2010); Steven W. Fitschen, Marriage Matters: A Case for a Get-the-Job-Done-Right Federal
Marriage Amendment, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1301, 1354–55 & n.369 (2007).
84. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
85. See id. at 452–53 (opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 469 (opinion
of Cushing, J.); id. at 472–74 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Pfander, supra note 6, at 1333–43 (presenting evidence that
the Eleventh Amendment is explanatory of Article III).
87. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1333–34 (discussing the significance of the addition of
“words of construction”).
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Eighth Amendments were also drafted against the backdrop of explanatory or
declaratory statutes. 88
As this history shows, explanatory enactments were not foreign to postratification America, and at least one such explanation is embedded in our
Constitution. Indeed, the distinction between declaratory acts on the one hand,
and what one treatise called innovating acts (i.e., statutes “introductive of new
matter”) on the other, remained a recognized feature of American statutory
interpretation well into the nineteenth century, 89 before largely disappearing
from modern treatises and legislatures. 90
By the late nineteenth century, explanatory statutes had taken on a narrower
role than they once enjoyed. As one treatise explained:
A declaratory act, or an act declaring the true intent of a previous act, does not
control the judiciary in deciding on the true construction of the first act, except
in cases arising subsequent to the declaratory act, or except in cases where a
retrospective act can properly be passed. 91

This rule may reflect two limitations on the role of explanatory statutes, one
constitutional and one interpretive.
Consider first the constitutional limitation. Over time, certain explanatory
statutes were met with disfavor in light of new conceptions of popular
sovereignty and the division of that sovereignty among different institutions
exercising different powers. 92 In one example, the Supreme Court refused to
apply a state’s explanatory statute where counsel had argued that saying what
the law is or has been is a judicial function, whereas saying what the law shall
be is legislative. 93 As a later example, the Harvard Law Review in 1896 reported
88. See David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing Transatlantic Context for
the Historical Meaning of “The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms” 22 L. & HIST. REV.
119, 156–57 (2004) (arguing that the Second Amendment’s preamble is “[d]eclaratory of the
common law”); Stinneford, supra note 64, at 537–38, 576–77 (arguing that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause “makes statutes authorizing criminal punishments analogous to the declaratory
statutes” because, like a declaration of custom, “punishment statutes can become void if they are
inconsistent with the actual custom of the jurisdiction”).
89. See, e.g., SEDGWICK, supra note 33, at 28–29. Consistent with this distinction, Professor
Brown details a specific example in which attorneys in the early Republic debated whether a statute
innovated the law of libel versus merely declaring it. See Brown, supra note 68, at 627–30.
90. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1314; Declaratory Legislation, supra note 8, at 143
(observing the decline in explanatory statutes in the early twentieth century).
91. SEDGWICK, supra note 33, at 214.
92. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
93. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1316 & n.212 (discussing Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 272 (1804)). To be sure, the Court did not expressly accept this distinction between saying
what the law is (a judicial power) and what it shall be (a legislative power). See id. That strict
distinction would also not accord with modern doctrine, which holds (for example) that Congress
can amend a law applicable to a pending case (i.e., change what the law “is” today) and require
courts to apply that law to pending cases, but it cannot change the law that has already been reduced
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a decision out of Pennsylvania “that all ‘declaratory’ or expository statutes are
wholly void, except when there was a real ambiguity in the terms of the previous
law.” 94 The Review reported the case as consequential because no prior decision
had held “that a declaratory statute is not binding on the courts so far as it is
applicable to transactions occurring after its enactment.” 95 That said, an
explanatory statute that resolved a genuine ambiguity going forward would not
seem to offend constitutional principles, but instead “performed a legitimate
function.” 96
Even so, the historical role of explanatory statutes may also have diminished
over time for reasons rooted in sound interpretive theory. In England, extrajudicial exposition grew up in an environment where judges could claim some
special insight into the meaning of certain statutes. 97 But it is one thing to say
that a legislature has special competence to identify the customary or common
law, 98 or to explain what its own policies mean; 99 it is quite another to say that
a legislature has special competence to identify the intent of some earlier
legislature in enacting particular words into positive law. 100 And that remains a
dominant view today; the modern Supreme Court has “often observed” that “the
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent
to a final judgment in a particular case (i.e., unsettle vested rights by changing what the law “was”
at the time of a final judgment). Compare, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018)
(plurality opinion) (holding that removal of jurisdiction over a pending case “is well within
Congress’s authority and does not violate Article III”) with, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211, 219–25 (1995) (holding that requirement to reopen final judgments violates Article
III).
94. Note, Interpretation of Statutes—Legislative Power, 10 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1896)
(discussing Commonwealth ex rel. Roney v. Warwick, 33 A. 373 (1895)).
95. Id.
96. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1322–23. Another way to think about permissible versus
impermissible explanatory statutes is through the framework of public rights versus private rights.
The former include the government’s proprietary interests, interests in exercising delegated
governmental power, interests in penal and regulatory law enforcement, statutory claims, and
taxation; the latter include common law rights in property and bodily integrity and in the
enforcement of contracts. See Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory
Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1020–21 (2006). Explanatory statutes might interfere with judicial
functions where private rights were at stake, but not where public rights were at stake. See id. at
1029 (using the example of a permissible explanatory statute retroactively declaring a municipal
charter’s meaning).
97. See supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Declaratory Legislation, supra note 8, at 141 (arguing that “declaratory statutes,
if passed by the same legislators who enacted the original act, would seem of some practical use,”
but observing that “[m]any such laws exhibit such a discrepancy in time between the declaratory
statute and the statute sought to be interpreted as to negative any possibility that the members of
the present legislature could have known what the original body meant by the use of particular
language”).
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of an earlier one.” 101 To be sure, some have suggested that this rule has
constitutional dimensions. 102 But where a legislature resolves an ambiguity with
new legislative action, that resolution properly applies only to unvested rights
not only for constitutional reasons, but because there is often no reason to think
that a later legislature can speak to the intended meaning of an earlier one.
Still, the point remains that explanatory statutes can serve some role in
course correcting erroneous judicial interpretations. Although a number of
constitutional constraints limit Congress’s ability to explain the law in a way
that intrudes on the resolution of particular cases or that affects vested private
rights, 103 there is no reason why Congress cannot enact an explanatory statute
that explains how a prior statute should be interpreted and applied in cases not
yet reduced to final judgment. 104 And even if Congress enacts a statute
purporting to say what the enacting Congress meant—a claim that would be
empirically suspect 105—that would not undermine the explanatory statute’s
validity or role. After all, prefatory language (as is often used to declare some
prior interpretation wrong or to assert some insight into original intended
meaning) 106 does not control over the operative statutory language—a rule as
deeply rooted in the American legal tradition as the explanatory statute itself. 107
As a functional matter, an explanatory statute’s operative text merely guides the
application of a pre-existing statute, which is no different from enacting an

101. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (internal
quotations omitted). This view is not necessarily as strong in every corner of the country. For
example, a leading treatise on California law provides that “although construction of a statute is a
judicial function, where a statute is unclear, a subsequent expression of the Legislature bearing
upon the intent of the prior statute may be properly considered in determining the effect and
meaning of the prior statute.” B. E. WITKIN ET AL., SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 141(3) (11th
ed. June 2020 Update) (quoting Tyler v. California, 134 Cal. App. 3d 973, 977 (1982)).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 536 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Constitution puts Congress in the business
of writing new laws, not interpreting old ones.”).
103. See, e.g., Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905 (plurality opinion) (stating that Congress cannot usurp
the power to apply the law to a particular pending case); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219–25 (holding that
Congress cannot direct the re-opening of final judgments for the application of new law);
Woolhandler, supra note 96, at 1029 (distinguishing explanatory statutes as applied to public versus
private rights).
104. Cf., e.g., Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he legislative power is the
power to make law, and Congress can make laws that apply retroactively to pending lawsuits, even
when it effectively ensures that one side wins.”) (citing Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310,
1324–27 (2016)).
105. Accord, e.g., South Dakota, 522 U.S. at 355; Declaratory Legislation, supra note 8, at 141.
106. See, e.g., supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (describing an example explanatory
statute from New Jersey); cf. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1319.
107. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–78 & n.4 (2008) (explaining
the settled role of prefatory language in interpreting operative clauses).
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amendment applicable to pending cases. 108 So, even if they have fallen out of
favor, we should not over-read limitations on explanatory statutes as precluding
their validity or unduly narrowing their role.
II. MODERN EXPLANATORY STATUTES: THE EXAMPLE OF SECTION 230 AND
FOSTA
Having established the customary features of explanatory statutes in
America, as well as their validity in certain circumstances, this Part argues that
Congress’s recent amendment to Section 230 fits comfortably into that mold.
This Part first explains Section 230’s background, including the conflicting
views about how broadly the immunity Congress codified in Section 230(c)(1)
sweeps, and then explains how the prevailing broad view of Section 230(c)(1)
immunity led to the dismissal of various claims seeking to hold websites
accountable for their roles in human sex trafficking, eventually prompting
Congress to enact FOSTA. Specifically, FOSTA amended Section 230 by
adding a new rule of construction clarifying that Section 230(c)(1) immunity
should not be construed to impair or limit certain sex trafficking claims. As then
explained, however, courts and commentators have read this directive narrowly,
which may be at odds with sound textualist interpretation (claims developed in
Parts III and IV).
A.

The Problem: Section 230 as a Defense to Sex-Trafficking Claims
1.

Section 230’s Enactment & Early Application

In 1996, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the
Telecommunications Act. 109 That statute included the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, 110 through which Congress sought to promote the
continued development of the Internet while empowering users to control the
information they receive and to restrict access to objectionable or inappropriate
material. 111 To that end, Congress enacted two provisions that protect websites
from certain civil and criminal claims. Section 230(c)(1) states: “No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” 112 Section 203(c)(2) also exempts from liability (A) actions
“voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of” certain

108. Cf., e.g., Declaratory Legislation, supra note 8, at 139 (defending explanatory statutes as
“in substance . . . making new law”).
109. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
110. Id. § 501.
111. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
112. Id. § 230(c)(1).
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objectionable content and (B) actions that give users the means to restrict access
to the same. 113
Congress enacted Section 230(c) in part to address a specific problem. With
respect to defamation liability, the common law distinguished publishers from
distributors. 114 The former were subject to strict liability because of their
editorial control, whereas the latter acted as conduits for others’ content and
were liable only if they knew that the transmitted content was defamatory. 115
Where a distributor learned that it was transmitting defamatory content, but
“intentionally and unreasonably” allowed its continued distribution, the law
treated the distributor as a secondary publisher. 116 As the Internet grew, the
question became how these principles would apply to websites that hosted
others’ speech.
In 1995, the country began to see a possible answer. In Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy Services, a New York state court held that a computer bulletin board
was a “publisher” of defamatory statements by an unidentified person who
commented on the board. 117 The court acknowledged the customary distinction
between publishers and distributors, 118 and held that the bulletin board was open
to the “greater liability” of a publisher through its “conscious choice[] to gain
the benefits of editorial control.” 119 This included holding itself out as
controlling content on the board, implementing an automatic software screening
program and guidelines for comments, and enforcing its guidelines through
technology and manpower. 120
Legislative history makes clear that Stratton Oakmont prompted Section 230
immunity. “One of the specific purposes” of Section 230 was to overrule
Stratton Oakmont “and any other similar decisions” that “treated” interactive
computer service providers “as publishers or speakers of content that is not their
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.” 121
Consistent with that purpose, Section 230(c)(1) prevents courts from treating
websites as publishers subject to liability merely for distributing third-party
content. Section 230(c)(2) then goes further by providing immunity for good
113. Id. § 230(c)(2).
114. See, e.g., Malwarebytes, 592 U.S. at 2–3 (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
115. See, e.g., id. at 3; 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 1:7, 4:92 (2d ed. Nov.
2020 Update); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977).
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. p. (1977); see also, e.g., SMOLLA,
supra note 115, at § 4:92; § 113. Basis of Liability, in PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 799, 803 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing when a distributor would be
“charged with publication” or “regarded as” a publisher).
117. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995).
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id. at *5.
120. Id. at *4.
121. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
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faith efforts to remove or restrict access to certain objectionable content—the
efforts the website in Stratton Oakmont undertook, only to find itself subject to
stricter liability. 122
In one sense, Section 230(c)(1) is a type of traditional explanatory or
declaratory statute: Congress identified the general common law of defamation,
as well as judicial confusion and error regarding its application in the Internet
age, and so reduced to writing how the traditional rule applies to websites. 123
However, Section 230 quickly received a much broader judicial gloss. The year
after enactment, the Fourth Circuit held that Section 230(c)(1) “creates federal
immunity” for all “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its
exercise of a publisher’s traditional functions—such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” 124 The court reasoned that this
followed from Congress’s “purpose . . . to maintain the robust nature of Internet
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the
medium to a minimum.” 125 This has now become the prevailing view in the
federal circuit courts. 126
To be sure, courts and commentators have debated precisely how Section
230(c)(1) applies. 127 The Fourth Circuit concluded, for example, that Section
230(c)(1) applies even where the interactive computer service provider knows
that it is hosting unlawful content. 128 This followed, in part, from how the court
understood the common law of defamation: A distributor that knowingly
transmits defamatory material is treated, as a matter of law, as a “secondary”
publisher in addition to the “primary” publisher who fist made the defamatory
comment. 129 Because those distributors are treated as publishers, Section
230(c)(1) applies. 130
This view has challengers. Some judges disagree that liability for
transmitting defamatory content is a mere subset of publisher liability; instead,
they view transmission as a distinct “distributor” liability that Section 230(c)(1)

122. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4–5.
123. Cf. SEDGWICK, supra note 33, at 29
124. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
125. Id.
126. See Almeida v. Amazon, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases);
but see Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (questioning this view).
127. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103–05 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing, but
not resolving, this “ongoing academic debate”).
128. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331–34.
129. See id. at 332 (citing § 113. Basis of Liability, in PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 799, 803 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
130. See id.
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does not address. 131 These arguments find significant support in the academy
and among other commentators. 132 And Justice Thomas has recently argued
from several textual clues that Section 230(c)(1) retains a distinction between
“publishers” subject to strict liability and “distributors” liable if they knowingly
transmit illegal content. 133
This Article does not address the substance of this debate, as it suffices here
simply to note that it exists. The important point is that the debate shows
disagreement and confusion over Section 230(c)(1)’s proper scope—
notwithstanding that one side of the debate is clearly winning in the courts.
2.

Section 230’s Application to Sex Trafficking Claims

Under the dominant broad view of Section 230 immunity, websites have
escaped liability for a variety of claims well beyond defamation. That makes
textual sense: “Section 230(c)(1) is general,” and its “scope” is therefore not
necessarily coextensive with its “genesis” in common law defamation. 134 Thus,
Section 230(c)(1) may apply not only to common law speech torts, but to other
causes of action that likewise look to speech content as a necessary element, i.e.,
where liability turns on a website’s legal responsibility for the content of a thirdparty user’s post. 135
But broad Section 230(c)(1) immunity has also allowed, for example, a
company to escape potential liability for “the deliberate structuring of its website
to facilitate sex trafficking”—a claim that has nothing to do with liability for
131. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 146
P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1022–23 (Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J.,
dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977)).
132. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 115, at § 4:86 (describing the argument as “excellent” and
criticizing the dominant judicial view as “far beyond . . . what Congress had in mind” and leaving
“accountability” and “respect for human dignity . . . severely compromised”); Susan Freiwald,
Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for
Defamation, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 569, 637–42 (2001) (questioning Zeran’s analysis); Michael
H. Spencer, Defamatory E-mail and Employer Liability: Why Razing Zeran v. America Online Is
a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 25, 37–38 (2000) (same); David. R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL
and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on
the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 168–72 (1997) (same); Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing
Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55
VAND. L. REV. 647, 679–90 (2002) (same); Annemarie Pantazis, Note, Zaran v. America Online,
Inc.: Insulating Internet Service Providers from Defamation Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
531, 547–50 (1999) (same).
133. See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 14–16
(Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
134. Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).
135. Cf. id. at 668, 671–72 (applying Section 230(c)(1) to a Fair Housing Act claim for
“publish[ing] . . . any notice . . . that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based
on” protected attributes).
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speech content. 136 That case involved Backpage, a user-based advertising
website that was once a leading marketplace for commercial sex. 137 Backpage
seemingly understood sex trafficking’s role in its business model; for example,
a Senate investigation brought to light that the website at various times deleted
words indicating criminality (e.g., “teenage” and “fresh”) or alerted posters to a
flagged word before allowing posters to delete or replace the word—something
opponents characterized as instructing sex traffickers on how to create
undetectable ads. 138
In Doe v. Backpage.com, three victims of child sex trafficking sued
Backpage for its role in their exploitation. 139 The plaintiffs alleged that
Backpage “engaged in a campaign to distract attention from its role in sex
trafficking” and “structure[ed] . . . its website to facilitate sex trafficking” by (1)
selectively removing posts by victim support organization and law enforcement
“sting” advertisements while (2) maintaining “rules and processes . . . designed
to encourage sex trafficking.” 140 Backpage allegedly failed to require phone
number or e-mail verification for posts; removed metadata from photographs in
advertisements, including the date, time, and location taken; and allowed posts
with easy workarounds for prohibited terms (e.g., substituting “brly legal” for
“barely legal”). 141 And Backpage allegedly had an economic incentive for these
decisions; the website charged a posting fee for “Adult Entertainment” ads
(where the sex trafficking ads were posted), so fostering an environment where
sex trafficking could thrive was to Backpage’s financial benefit. 142
The Backpage.com plaintiffs sued for (among other things) violations of
federal and state sex trafficking laws. 143 Notably, neither law looked to the
content of any speech as a necessary element of the cause of action. 144 Yet, the
136. See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2016).
137. Born, supra note 23, at 1626–27. Before 2018, Backpage earned eighty percent of total
online commercial sex advertising revenue in the United States and was cited in seventy-three
percent of child sex trafficking reports to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
Id. For a more detailed background on the legal and political reaction to Backpage’s role in sex
trafficking, see generally id. at 1626–37 (describing complaints and investigations involving
Backpage and FOSTA’s development and passage) and Goldman, supra note 19, at 280–92
(similar).
138. Born, supra note 23, at 1627.
139. 817 F.3d at 16.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 16–17.
142. See id. at 17.
143. See id.
144. The plaintiffs sued under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595 (2018), and the Massachusetts Anti-Human Trafficking and
Victim Protection Act (“MATA”), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 50 (West 2012). Federal law
creates a civil remedy for victims against “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving
anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known
has engaged in an act in violation of” federal human trafficking laws. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
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district court dismissed those claims on the ground of Section 230 immunity. 145
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed—a result that the court acknowledged
would “deny relief to plaintiffs whose circumstances evoke outrage.” 146 Citing
the Fourth Circuit’s Zeran decision and related cases, the First Circuit reasoned
that Section 230(c)(1) receives a broad construction that immunizes against any
cause of action the necessarily requires that the defendant be treated as the
publisher or speaker of content provided by another. 147 Because the plaintiffs’
sex trafficking and consumer protection claims relied on the contents of
advertisements posted by, or at the direction of, the sex traffickers, the court
reasoned that immunity applied because “there would be no harm . . . but for the
content of the postings.” 148 In other words, even though liability would not be
traceable to the content (because the cause of action did not look to speech
content as an element), Section 230(c)(1) still applied because the harm was
traceable to the content. The court also held that Backpage’s posting rules were
likewise traditional editorial functions subject to Section 230(c)(1) immunity. 149
Thus, Section 230(c)(1) precluded each of the plaintiffs’ sex trafficking
claims. 150
B.

The Solution: FOSTA’s Statutory Rule of Construction
1.

Congress’s Reaction to Backpage.com & Related Cases

Even before Backpage.com, public criticism of Backpage had been building
for years. 151 Since 2011, scrutiny from state attorneys general and the general
public had put pressure on Backpage’s owner to shut down the website. 152 In
2015, Congress “expressly targeted Backpage” by extending an existing federal
sex trafficking crime to include knowingly advertising sex trafficking victims. 153
That same year, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Massachusetts provides a civil remedy for victims against one who “knowingly . . . benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value, as a result of a violation” of state human sex
trafficking law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 50(a) (West 2012), and further provides that a
“business entity that knowingly aids or is a joint venturer in trafficking of persons for sexual
servitude shall be civilly liable for an offense.” Id. § 50(d).
145. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 158–64.
146. Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 15, 29 (1st Cir. 2016).
147. See id. at 18–19.
148. Id. at 19–20.
149. See id. at 21–22.
150. Id. at 24.
151. See Wiesner, supra note 20, at 158 (“Following the decision in Doe, popular outrage
against Backpage came to a head.”).
152. See Born, supra note 23, at 1630 (describing events between 2011 and 2015).
153. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 282 (citing the SAVE Act, part of the larger Justice for
Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-22).
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launched its investigation into Backpage’s business practices. 154 The
investigation culminated in a January 2017 Staff Report concluding that
Backpage (1) “knowingly concealed evidence of criminality by systematically
editing its ‘adult’ ads” and (2) knowingly facilitated “prostitution and child sex
trafficking” and “may also have tried to manipulate the number of childexploitation reports it forwards to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children.” 155 The Report also noted that although “Backpage does not deny that
its site is used for criminal activity, including the sale of children for sex,” the
website “has long claimed that it is a mere host of content created by others and
therefore immune from liability under [Section 230(c)(1) of] the
Communications Decency Act.” 156
Not long after the Report was issued, legislation was introduced in each
chamber of Congress to address issues that the Report brought to light.
FOSTA—which would go on to become law—was introduced in the House of
Representatives, with a counterpart (the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of
2017) in the Senate. 157 In its report on FOSTA, the House Judiciary Committee
identified “online classified sites like Backpage.com” as “one of the primary
channels of sex trafficking.” 158 The Committee also concluded that Section 230
“has complicated enforcement” of the law by enabling websites “to successfully
invoke [Section 230(c)(1) immunity] despite engaging in actions that go far
beyond publisher functions”—including a specific reference to the First
Circuit’s Backpage.com decision. 159
Importantly, legislative disapproval of decisions like Backpage.com extends
beyond just the legislative history. In FOSTA’s text, Congress concluded that
Section 230 “was never intended to provide legal protection to websites that
unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and websites that facilitate
traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking
victims.” 160 To rein in that protection for “bad-actor websites” like Backpage, 161
Congress directed that nothing in Section 230 “other than subsection (c)(2)(A)”

154. See id.; STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 114TH CONG.,
BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING 10 (Comm. Print
2017).
155. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 154, at 2, 3.
156. Id. at 1.
157. Born, supra note 23, at 1633 n.61; see Wiesner, supra note 20, at 160–63 (describing the
competing proposals); Goldman, supra note 19, at 282–84 (describing the development of
FOSTA’s final form).
158. H.R. REP. NO. 115-572(I), at 3 (2018).
159. Id. at 4. The House Report erroneously ascribes the Backpage.com decision to the Second
Circuit, id., but from context the reference is clear.
160. FOSTA, Pub. L. 115-164, § 2(1), 132 Stat. 1253.
161. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572(I), at 4 (2018).
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should be “construed to impair or limit” certain civil and criminal claims arising
from sex trafficking. 162
Even though enacted as a formal amendment to pre-existing law, FOSTA’s
treatment of Section 230 has the hallmarks of an explanatory statute. First, the
statute’s full title contains language of explanation, 163 in that FOSTA amends
“the Communications Act of 1934 to clarify that section 230 of such Act does
not prohibit the enforcement against providers and users of interactive computer
services of Federal and State criminal and civil law relating to sexual
exploitation of children or sex trafficking.” 164 Second, FOSTA includes a
preamble acknowledging errors in prior interpretation, 165 i.e., the development
of “legal protection” for websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate sex
trafficking. 166 Third, FOSTA operates retrospectively by declaring that a prior
law, i.e., Section 230(c)(1), shall not be “construed” in a particular manner. 167
Although not a perfect fit with the explanatory statutes of old, FOSTA’s
Section 230 amendment might be considered a modern spin on the explanatory
statute. It follows in the tradition of legislative correction of errant
interpretations, but it does so in a more modern way by operating as an

162. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). The enumerated claims are (A) civil actions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595, if the conduct underlying the claim is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which generally
prohibits sex trafficking children by force, fraud, or coercion; (B) state criminal charges, if the
conduct underlying the charge is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591; and (C) state criminal charges, if
the conduct underlying the charge is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421A and promotion or facilitation
of prostitution is illegal where it was targeted. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). In simplified form,
Section 2421A prohibits owning, managing, or operating (or conspiring to own, manage, or
operate) a website with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person.
163. Cf. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1319 (identifying as a common feature “titles or descriptions
containing language of explanation, declaration, or construction”).
164. FOSTA, Pub. L. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253.
165. Cf. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1319 (identifying as a common feature “a preamble” or other
statement acknowledging “the existence of doubt or confusion in the current state of the law”
necessitating “a legislative fix”).
166. See FOSTA, Pub. L. 115-164, § 2(1), 132 Stat. 1253.
167. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5); cf. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1319 (identifying as a common feature
that the statutes “almost invariably proposed to operate retrospectively by providing a rule of
judicial construction in the resolution of past or pending cases,” and “[i]n many instances, the
statutes declared that a previous law shall (or shall not) be construed in a particular manner”). Note
that retrospective application is not retroactive application; FOSTA can retrospectively apply to
pending cases involving conduct that occurred prior its enactment, but it cannot (for example)
retroactively apply to unsettle the rights vested by the final judgment in Backpage.com. Cf.
McDonnell, supra note 5, at 801–02 (drawing the same distinction); see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–25 (1995) (holding that a new law cannot impair obligations already settled
by final judgment); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994) (defining retroactivity
by reference to whether a statute “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws,
or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, in respect to transactions or considerations already
past”).
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amendment rather than a stand-alone instruction to courts. 168 But the amendment
is still, at bottom, just a rule of construction—not a specific carve out or more
refined definition of some ambiguous term. FOSTA’s amendment performs the
same function as explanatory statutes of centuries past.
2.

FOSTA’s Early Judicial Application

So far, however, FOSTA has not dramatically changed the Section 230
landscape. 169 Unaccustomed to the traditional explanatory statute, courts and
commentators approach FOSTA using interpretative rules that do not
necessarily fit within the explanatory tradition of which FOSTA is a part. The
result is a perhaps unnecessarily constrained view of FOSTA’s new rule of
construction.
Consider J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, LLC, 170 one of the first decisions to provide
an extended analysis of FOSTA’s amendment to Section 230. J.B. is a survivor
of child sex trafficking who brought claims for violations of federal and
California sex trafficking law against several defendants allegedly involved in
her exploitation, including the website Craigslist. 171 J.B. alleged that she was
advertised on Craigslist, 172 which she claims knew but disregarded human sex
trafficking through its website and instead “provided cover for advertisements
of minors.” 173
In 2020, Craigslist prevailed on a motion to dismiss J.B.’s California sex
trafficking claims on the ground of Section 230 immunity. 174 In discussing
FOSTA’s effect on state civil sex trafficking claims, the court reasoned that
Congress’s decision to identify three categories of preserved claims—those in
subparagraphs (A) through (C) of Section 230(e)(5)175—implied the exclusion
of any other preserved claims. 176 Thus, the statute’s “plain language” did not
“carve out” state law civil claims from Section 230 immunity. 177 The court next
considered FOSTA’s legislative history, noting that “it is not clear that Congress
was concerned specifically with permitting civil claims under state law.” 178
Then, as a final textual point, the court conceded that reading FOSTA as an
168. Cf. Declaratory Legislation, supra note 8, at 143 (noting the early twentieth century turn
away from explanatory statutes and towards the “simple amendment”).
169. For a broader discussion of FOSTA’s early effects, see Goldman, supra note 19, at 289–
92; Born, supra note 23, at 1647–52; and Wiesner, supra note 20, at 169–74.
170. No. 19-cv-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020).
171. See id. at *1.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *2.
174. See id. at *3–7.
175. See discussions and sources cited supra note 162.
176. J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, LLC, No. 19-cv-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 20, 2020).
177. Id.
178. Id. at *6.
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exhaustive list of preserved claims could lead to an absurd result. 179 In FOSTA,
Congress created a new civil cause of action for sex trafficking victims, 18
U.S.C. § 2421A(c), that is not included in the list of preserved sex trafficking
claims. 180 To avoid a result in which Section 230(c)(1) swallowed Section
2421A(c), the court interpreted Section 230(e)(5) as exhaustive as to preserved
state law claims, but not as to federal claims. 181 Commentators, too, have
assumed without analysis that Section 230(e)(5) is only a narrow carve out from
Section 230(c)(1) immunity, 182 and litigants have quickly embraced this analysis
in arguments to other courts. 183
Absent from the J.B. court’s analysis is any careful attention to Congress’s
choice to enact the FOSTA amendment in the form of an explanatory statute.
The Court did not consider the effect of the instruction for how to “construe[]”
Section 230(c)(1), 184 nor the broader contextual clues that Congress disagreed
broadly with immunity from sex trafficking claims. Those clues include
FOSTA’s title, which refers broadly to federal and state criminal and civil
claims; 185 similarly broad language in FOSTA’s Section 2, which speaks to the
need for “clarification” of Section 230 to prevent “legal protection” for
promoting and facilitating prostitution and advertising the sale of unlawful sex
acts with sex trafficking victims; 186 and evidence that Congress was concerned
in particular with the result of Backpage.com, in which sex trafficking victims
lost their suit alleging federal and state law civil claims. 187
III. MODERN EXPLANATORY STATUTES: A TEXTUALIST APPROACH
Given FOSTA’s parallels to the traditional explanatory statute, is there a
better way to approach interpreting this amendment? This Part begins to answer
that question by setting out a textualist approach to modern explanatory statutes.
Section A identifies (descriptively) certain defining elements of textualism as
carried out in the current federal judiciary. Then, drawing on recent and leading
textualist authority (both academic and judicial) and historical approaches to the
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, LLC, No. 19-cv-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 20, 2020).
182. See sources cited supra notes 20–23.
183. See, e.g., Doe v. Twitter, Inc., No. 21-cv-00485-JCS, 2021 WL 3675207, at *28 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 19, 2021) (following J.B.); Doe v. Reddit, Inc., No. SACV-21-768-JVS(KESx), 2021
WL 4348731, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2021) (same); Reply Brief of Relator, In re Facebook, Inc.,
No. 20-0434, 2020 WL 5594224, at *3, *18 (Tex. Sept. 8, 2020); Brief of Amicus Curiae the
Internet Ass’n Supporting Relator, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 20-0434, 2020 WL 5876835, at *4,
*18, *22–23 (Tex. Sept. 21, 2020).
184. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).
185. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text.
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application of explanatory enactments, Section B advances an approach built on
those textualist commitments. The goal of this approach is to give due weight to
semantic content, background social context, and legislators’ reasonable
expectations about the application of explanatory statutes.
A.

Identifying Textualism’s Defining Elements

In recent decades, textualism has “gained considerable prominence within
the federal judiciary,” even as legal scholars remain skeptical or dismissive. 188
But what is meant by textualism? That question has already received significant
theoretical attention, 189 and the object of this Article is not to identify a grand
theory of textualism. Instead, it suffices here to offer a descriptive account of
what leading contemporary judicial textualists do (or at least purport to do) with
interpretation.
Begin with Justice Scalia, a leading judicial advocate for textualism. 190
Justice Scalia described textualism’s goal as identifying “a sort of ‘objectified’
intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law,
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.” 191 The idea is not to identify
or to give effect to a subjective intent—e.g., the “intent of the legislature” or the
statute’s unenumerated spirit or purpose—but to identify and to apply the
meaning a reasonable person would be authorized to understand that the
legislature intended with its chosen words. 192
Notably, then, textualist inquiry is contextual. 193 It must be; textualism
measures objectified intent by reference to the remainder of the law, so the whole
of our law informs the reasonable meaning to derive from a particular statute. 194
Serious textualists and commentators therefore recognize that textualism is a lot
188. Grove, supra note 27, at 265. Portions of this Section are adapted from, and expand on,
this author’s prior work on contemporary textualism. See Adam G. Crews, The So-Called SeriesQualifier Canon, 116 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 198 (2021), https://scholarlycommons.law.north
western.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1316&context=nulr_online.
189. See generally, e.g., Grove, supra note 27 (identifying competing textualisms); John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) [hereinafter
Manning, Textualists]; Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005) [hereinafter
Nelson, Textualism].
190. See, e.g., Crews, supra note 188, at 202 n.24 (citing John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 685 (1997)).
191. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
192. See id. at 16–17.
193. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 27, at 269 & n.27 (arguing that “emphasis on sematic context,”
particularly as compared to “social or policy context,” is “an important distinction among
textualist[s]”); Manning, Textualists, supra note 189, at 76 (arguing that emphasis on semantic
context distinguishes textualism from purposivism).
194. See Scalia, supra note 191, at 17.
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more than just the reflexive application of dictionary definitions to resolve a
dispute. 195 Rather, among the many legitimate tools of textualist statutory
interpretation are the ordinary meaning of words, informed by broader statutory
and legal context, as well the statute’s structure, history, and purpose, all read
through the lens of (and with help from) basic common sense. 196 Within this
contextual inquiry, things can get complicated. Professor Grove has identified
that the Supreme Court’s textualists vacillate between a formalistic textualism
that emphasizes semantic context—i.e., the way we use words—and a flexible
textualism that emphasizes social context—i.e., broadly known aspects of
American life that inform our understandings of directives. 197 In other words,
the Supreme Court’s current textualists are inconsistent about the weight they
place on different contextual clues, such as semantic rules on the one hand and
reasonable social expectations on the other. 198
Even accepting that there are divisions or inconsistencies within textualism,
different views about the weight to afford different contextual clues do not
undermine that certain key precepts unite textualists. In general, textualists give
precedence to semantic context over policy context. 199 The preference for
semantic over policy context means that, on balance, textualist judges will be
inclined to afford a narrower scope to statutes than a purposivist might; the
textualist will limit the policy consensus to what the statute’s text bears, while
the purposivist might discern and apply a broader policy consensus. 200
195. See, e.g., id. at 24 (stating that a “good textualist is not a literalist,” but also not “a nihilist”);
Crews, supra note 188, at 203 (noting that cues about meaning “can come from a lot more places
than just a dictionary or grammar book”); Grove, supra note 27, at 291 (“Modern textualists insist
that the method is not literalism.”).
196. Justice Kagan, a self-described textualist, see Grove, supra note 27, at 265 n.1, has
identified these “tools of divining meaning,” while warning against interpreting words “in a
vacuum” or just “staring at, or even looking up, the words” at issue. See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S.
Ct. 1619, 1626 (2016); Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014). Those lessons, and
others, have trickled down through the federal courts, where serious textualist judges acknowledge,
e.g., that “although the analysis properly focuses on the text, the analysis is not necessarily limited
to the text,” and that dictionary definitions “are valuable tools in approximating the sense in which
linguistic communities use and understand words,” but are “not necessarily dispositive.” See, e.g.,
Angiotech Pharms. Inc. v. Lee, 191 F.Supp.3d 509, 521, 522 n.24 (E.D. Va. 2016) (citing, e.g.,
CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 126 (2011)).
197. See Grove, supra note 27, at 279–90 (Professor Grove advanced her analysis using Bostock
v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), as a focal point).
198. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 27, at 290 n.167 (noting that “no self-proclaimed textualist on
the Supreme Court has clearly signed on to one version of textualism” and citing votes by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kagan as evidence of variation in approach).
199. See Manning, Textualists, supra note 189, at 76. By “policy context,” Professor Manning
means “evidence that suggests the way a reasonable person would address the mischief being
remedied.” Id. This differs from Professor Grove’s “social context,” which refers to a base-level
“familiarity with American history and culture.” Grove, supra note 27, at 280.
200. Cf. Nelson, Textualism, supra note 189, at 371.
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Textualists are also prone to favor rules over standards. 201 Indeed, a rule-like
and formalistic interpretative approach may be more likely to constrain judicial
discretion and thereby preserve legislative supremacy and judicial legitimacy, 202
which is both a normative justification underlying textualism as well as a
descriptive account of what prominent textualist federal judges aim to do. 203
But even if committed to rules, textualists stand ready to apply statutes that,
on their face, afford common-law-like judicial discretion. Antitrust law is an
example. As noted textualist Judge Easterbrook has observed, 204 “The statute
books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that
effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law,” even when
“they do not always supply a rule of decision.” 205 Indeed, Justice Scalia once
held that “[t]he Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its
dynamic potential,” which “invokes the common law itself, and not merely the
static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.” 206 So a
preference for rules has its limits, for example where a statute embraces the very
concept of dynamic common law legal development. In that situation, the way
to apply the statute faithfully is to understand its directive in the context of the
broader corpus juris, 207 including the background common law principles that it
embodies and carries forward.
And this leads to one final point about the role of the corpus juris. One rulelike way to apply a directive is to replicate how prior, materially similar
directives have been applied in the past. To the extent textualism’s aim is to
effectuate what an informed, reasonable person would understand the legislature
to have meant in light of the entire corpus juris (and, perhaps, in light of other
aspects of social context), 208 we might think that a reasonable person would
201. See, e.g., id. at 372–403; cf. Grove, supra note 27, at 269 (advocating for a “formalistic
textualism” that is “relatively rule-bound” and “emphasizes semantic context, rather than social or
policy context, and downplays the practical consequences of a decision”).
202. See Grove, supra note 27, at 290–307 (advancing a theoretical case for formalistic
textualism).
203. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Book Review, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint,
115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 754 (2017) (noting that Justice Scalia and others before him would “invoke
concerns about judicial subjectivity as a way to justify textualism”) [hereinafter Manning, Justice
Scalia]; Grove, supra note 27, at 293 (“For many early textualists, the goal was not only to preserve
legislative supremacy but also to constrain judicial discretion.”); Nelson, Textualism, supra note
189, at 403 (noting that textualists are less “receptive to a background presumption of judicial
discretion”); accord, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“If judges
could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual
sources and our own imaginations, we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process
reserved for the people’s representatives.”).
204. See Grove, supra note 27, at 273.
205. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983).
206. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
207. Cf. Scalia, supra note 191, at 17.
208. See id.; cf. Grove, supra note 27, at 280.
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understand a directive to a court to require that court to follow the directive the
same way it followed prior, materially similar directives. In other words, how
courts have previously approached directives might inform the objective content
of a later, materially similar directive. Thus, for example, committed textualist
judges and justices have reasoned that where a text uses a known drafting
technique—a non obstante clause, 209 for example—the historical legal context
surrounding the technique’s use and application should inform the new text’s
meaning and application today. 210
B.

Identifying a Textualist Approach to Modern Explanatory Statutes

Broadly speaking, the preceding section sought to make four points. First, a
defining characteristic of judicial textualism is a preference for rule-like, textgrounded ways to discern a directive’s content. Second, notwithstanding that
preference for rules, textualism acknowledges a role for social context and basic
common sense; meaning is not always mechanical, and it is fair game to interpret
words by reference to social clues so long as the focus remains on identifying
objectified intent and not merely subjective legislative intent. Third, if semantic
and social contextual clues point to a broad grant of dynamic, common-law-like
discretion, the preference for rules must yield to the actual directive that
Congress gave. Fourth, even within a broad grant of judicial discretion, a rulelike and disciplined way to exercise that discretion—so as to remain as faithful
as possible to reasonable expectations—is to replicate established methods of
interpreting and applying materially similar directives in the past. This section
explains how these points can inform a textualist approach to modern
explanatory statutes.

209. Historically, “[c]ourts understood non obstante provisions to mean that, ‘[r]ather than
straining the new statute in order to harmonize it with prior law, [they] were supposed to give the
new statute its natural meaning and to let the chips fall where they may.’” Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S.
Ct. 791, 807 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV.
225, 242 (2000)).
210. Committed textualists on the Supreme Court have identified the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, as using this technique, and they have urged reading the Clause
in line with the technique’s historic use and understanding. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564
U.S. 604, 621–23 (2011) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and
Alito, JJ.); Kansas, 140 S. Ct. at 807–08 (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., concurring). So, too,
in the statutory context, where judges have identified the use of “the classical but sometimes
forgotten” technique. See Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1095 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (Williams, J.). Although this rationale in the constitutional context is better described as a
form of originalism, it finds support in the same commitments that underlie statutory textualism.
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 191, at 38 (noting that, as with statutory textualism, constitutional
interpretation looks at “how the text of the Constitution was originally understood” to “intelligent
and informed people of the time”); Manning, Justice Scalia, supra note 203, at 754 (identifying
anti-discretion as underlying both approaches).
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The Semantic Significance of Construction

Given the primacy of semantic context in textualism (as opposed to
purposivism), 211 a textualist approach to explanatory statutes will unsurprisingly
pay careful attention to the words forming the directive. In particular,
interpreters should begin their analysis with sensitivity to two issues: What is
being said to whom?
Start with the “what” question. Legislatures have significant leeway in how
to draft directives in explanatory statutes. To borrow an oft-used example,
suppose at Time 1 a legislature enacts a statute that says: “No vehicles may be
operated in the park.” 212 Later, at Time 2, a court applies the directive to prohibit
ambulances in the park. If, at Time 3, the legislature wants to declare that
interpretation incorrect via an explanatory statute, it has various options. At one
extreme, the legislature might say: “‘Vehicle’ does not include ambulances.”
This directive removes a single item—an ambulance—from the semantic scope
of “vehicle,” suggesting that other things we generally think of as vehicles may
remain prohibited. But on another extreme, the legislature might say: “This
provision shall not be construed to impair or limit emergency personnel in
performing their duties.” That explanation does a lot more than permit
ambulances; it directs a rule of application that would allow a police officer to
pursue a thief on a bicycle or motorcycle, a fire fighter to bring in her firetruck
to put out flames, and more.
This example highlights the traditional distinction between interpretation
and construction. Whereas interpretation identifies the semantic content of a
directive (e.g., answering whether “vehicle” includes “ambulance”),
construction gives legal effect to that content by translating the semantic
meaning into a legal rule or doctrine (e.g., whether “no vehicles” yields to rules
promoting emergency services). 213 The need for construction arises where a
directive is vague; because the directive does not dictate a particular rule of
decision, the court must craft one that effectuates the sematic content. 214 This
nuanced distinction is somewhat of a term of art in the law, 215 but even in
ordinary usage an instruction to “construe” a statute most naturally refers to a
process for how to make sense of the relationship between words, 216 i.e., how to

211. See, e.g., Manning, Textualists, supra note 189, at 76.
212. Cf., e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Book Review, No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2041, 2041 (2006).
213. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 100, 103 (2010).
214. See id. at 106–07.
215. Cf., e.g., Platinum Supplemental Ins., Inc. v. Guar. Trust Life Ins. Co., 989 F.3d 556, 571
n.8 (7th Cir. 2021) (recognizing the interpretation-construction distinction).
216. See, e.g., Construe, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (to “construe” is to
“ascertain the meaning of language” through “arrangement, interpretation and inference”);
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derive a rule from the whole of the message. So, when a directive tells an
interpreter to “construe,” that directive requires something different from merely
identifying semantic content—it is a directive for how to fashion a rule to carry
the content into effect.
Given that, we might think that instructions to “construe” are directives to
courts. Construction is a quintessential judicial function. When we speak of legal
doctrine—the output of construction 217—we are speaking of the body of judicial
outcomes produced over time as courts apply a rule. When a legislature enacts
an explanatory statute with a rule of construction, we might understand that the
legislature (1) recognizes linguistic vagueness in the initial statute and (2) tells
courts that the doctrine evolving from application of that statute should include,
or exclude, some set of outcomes.
A textualist approach to explanatory statutes should afford significance to
the choice of instruction. Many of the hallmarks of a textualist approach—like
emphasis on ordinary public meaning 218 and a preference for rules that promote
clear guidance 219—advance important values when interpreting directives to the
ordinary citizen. 220 But if an explanatory statute is really a directive to
sophisticated judicial interpreters, we would expect these interpreters to have
deeper understandings about social context—i.e., the remainder of the corpus
juris—than the ordinary person. Thus, some interpretative techniques that we
use for ordinary statutes in an effort to simplify the law for the common man
may not be justified when talking about a directive to judges in particular, aimed
at fixing particular judge-made errors. This is not to say that explanatory statutes
are an exception to rules about applying the ordinary public meaning of words.
To the contrary, where the ordinary public meaning of words—like
“construe”—refers to a background legal principle of judicial doctrine-making
in an area where the law is vague, we must take that seriously. And as a result,
the types of rule-like canons that we might apply in interpretation (where
semantic meaning is at issue) are not necessarily appropriate where the directive
is a rule of construction (where doctrine-making is at issue). Simply put, a rule
of construction is not the same thing as a definition or a carve-out provision, and
it should not be treated as one.

Construe, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 489 (1981) (to “construe” is to
“analyze the arrangement and connection of words”).
217. See Solum, supra note 2133, at 103.
218. E.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“The Court normally
interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its
enactment.”).
219. Cf. Nelson, Textualism, supra note 189, at 416.
220. See, e.g., New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (identifying interests in
democratic self-governance and preservation of reliance interests).
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The Contextual Significance of Background Law

Given the appropriate role of social context, interpreters should also
appreciate the legal backdrop against which an explanatory statute is drafted.
Recall that the explanatory statute grew up in a unique context, insofar as the
earliest examples declared the existing common law. 221 As legislatures’ roles
evolved over time, statutes began to make new law, 222 and a legislature might
later explain what a pre-existing statute meant. 223 Situating a particular
explanatory statute in one of these traditions informs how courts should react to
a legislature’s course correcting directive.
To explain this point, let’s start with the more modern example: statutory
reasoning. When dealing with innovating statutes, i.e., those that make new law,
a textualist will try to identify the best objective meaning of the words as a
reasonably informed person would understand them. 224 If a legislature
concludes that a court selected a sub-optimal reading, a later explanatory statute
simply sharpens the meaning of the initial statute; the new explanatory words
provide additional semantic context that inform application of the initial
statutory directive. That is the case with the earlier example about vehicles in
the park; a later legislative explanation that “vehicle” does not include
“ambulance” sharpens the semantic content of “vehicle” and so clarifies the
initial statute’s reach.
But some statutes embrace dynamic common law doctrines, which can
permit greater judicial discretion. 225 In the traditional (albeit oversimplified)
account, the common law developed case-by-case, either in the absence of a
substantive directive or as an application of vague directives providing little
concrete guidance, until over time norms developed regarding the rules of
decision. 226 These norms only rarely became broad prospective rules, but even
when they did it was understood that the rules were defeasible when resolution
of a particular case called for avoiding or modifying the rule. 227 To speak of a
common law “rule” was simply to describe, at a high level of generality, the
custom that caused particular facts to result in particular outcomes. 228

221. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020); New Prime Inc., 139
S. Ct. at 539.
225. See supra notes 204–207 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 770
(2004).
227. See id.
228. Cf., e.g., LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 40 (8th ed. 2010)
(describing the common law’s growth from custom and eventual distillation to commentaries that
“became a convenient guide for helping judges decide future similar legal cases”).
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In this respect, common law reasoning can differ materially from statutory
reasoning. If a legislature identifies a subset of cases in which courts read an
innovating statute too broadly or too narrowly, the issue is likely interpretive
and resolvable by sharpening definitions and thereby removing ambiguity. But
the common law develops from the collective resolution of cases in the face of
a vagueness problem. 229 If a legislature identifies a subset of decisions in the
whole body of common law cases that it deems erroneous, it is not necessarily
sufficient for courts to maintain the same overarching “rule” that decided those
particular cases, but just to refuse to apply that rule to similar cases going
forward. Instead, the process of coherent common law judging may require
reconsideration of the underlying rule, thereby creating a new rule or rationale
that logically accounts for the exclusion of the cases that the legislature deemed
wrongly decided.
This can be illustrated with a simplified example. Suppose that, over time,
a jurisdiction decides an unbroken line of cases holding people liable for battery
due to their uninvited touching of another. In a series of later cases, courts begin
to apply this rule to doctors who render aid to the unconscious or others who,
for whatever reason, cannot offer prior consent. To stop that trend, the legislature
passes an explanatory statute providing: “Whereas the law of battery was never
intended to discourage rendering emergency medical aid, the law of battery shall
not be applied to impair or limit doctors in rendering emergency aid to another
without prior invitation.” One way to read and to apply that directive faithfully
is to treat it as a carve-out for doctors. But what about nurses, emergency medical
technicians, or the CPR-trained lifeguard at the city pool? One might think that
the legislature’s directive embodies some sensitivity to the need for emergency
medical aid more generally. At the very least, we would not read the directive—
in light of the preamble—as requiring battery to lie where a nurse, EMT, or
lifeguard renders emergency aid. Thus, an equally faithful way to read and to
apply the statute is to revise the law of battery in general, perhaps so that the
new common law rule could be summarized as: “Any uninvited touching
unrelated to emergency aid is battery.”
The same result may be justified where, for example, a legislature has
already reduced a general common law proposition to writing. A directive of
that sort may well be vague and not supply a clear rule of decision for every
context, yet also not so rigid that it freezes in place concepts only as they existed
at the time the common law was “declared” via statute. 230 So, a statute
embodying a common law concept may be materially different from a purely
innovating statute, insofar as the former incorporates dynamism and judicial
229. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 2266; cf. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 2288 (noting that
the common law developed from the gradual acceptance of some local customs and rejection of
others).
230. See, e.g., supra notes 204–207 and accompanying text (discussing the Sherman Act).
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discretion beyond what the latter might allow. And, given that, a later
explanation of a common-law-declaring statute may require a materially
different application than a legislative explanation of an innovating statute.
3.

The Historical Significance of Prior Practice

The preceding sections have tried to parse out material distinctions in (1) the
semantic message that an explanatory statute can convey and (2) the background
context that is being clarified. To recap, a directive to “construe” is semantically
different from a directive that adds definition; the former informs the scope and
direction of an overarching doctrine, whereas the latter simply provides
additional detail for understanding semantic meaning. 231 In the social context,
exposition of a pre-existing statutory rule might provide stricter and clearer
guidance than an explanation of a pre-existing common law rule that happened
to have been reduced to writing. In general, a purely statutory rule requires only
what its plain language demands, as ordinarily understood. A statute that
embodies a dynamic common law concept, by contrast, may call for case-bycase development and revision in line with the common law method. 232
In short, explanatory statutes that instruct courts how to “construe” preexisting legislation that itself just declares the common law are unique creatures
that implicate unique interpretative considerations. With these statutes, the
legislature is presuming some measure of underlying vagueness and doctrinal
dynamism. Thus, there may be several ways to derive a rule that fulfills the
legislature’s construction directive. Simply put, there’s more play in the joints
when dealing with explanatory statutes of this type. Depending on broader
context, a particular directive for construing a statute of this sort invites—or in
some situations requires—revision to what we might call the common law
“rule” that developed from the accumulation of judicial applications of the vague
initial statute.
Significantly, this distinction between exposition of pre-existing statutory
rules on the one hand, and instructions for construing written directives that
embody common law rules on the other, has some support in historical practice.
Replicating this history is a way to channel judicial discretion to achieve
interpretive outcomes that we might expect a legislature to desire when it
chooses one type of explanatory statute over another. For much the same reason
we might expect a legislature to use a legal term of art in its term of art sense,
we might expect a legislature to use a particular drafting technique to invite
judicial interpretation and application in line with how that technique has
traditionally been interpreted and applied. 233

231. See generally supra Part III.B.1.
232. See generally supra Part III.B.2.
233. See supra notes 30–31, 2088–210, and accompanying text.
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So, what are some historically grounded rules for interpreting explanatory
statutes? Consider first the historical approach to applying explanatory statutes
that place a gloss on prior innovating statutes. A pertinent Founding-era treatise
teaches that the “Sense of Words used in an Explanatory Statute ought not to be
extended by an equitable Construction: but their Meaning, the Explanatory
Statute being a legislative Construction of the Words used in a former Statute,
ought to be strictly adhered to.” 234 What do we make of this?
As an initial matter, we might question whether this rule reflects American
practice at all. The cited rule, which is rooted entirely in English cases,235
harkens back to the ancient common law doctrine of “equity of the statute”—
hence the reference to an “equitable Construction” 236—which “authorized
courts to extend a clear statute to reach omitted cases that fell within its ratio or
purpose, and conversely, to imply exceptions to such a statute when the text
would inflict harsh results that did not serve the statutory purpose.” 237 But as
Professor Manning has shown, there are compelling reasons under American
constitutional structure to doubt the legitimacy of equity of the statute on this
side of the Atlantic, 238 and Founding-era history “tends to support” that
structural argument “against transplanting the English equity of the statute
doctrine to American constitutional circumstances.” 239 So, a treatise describing
the holdings of foreign law that America did not readily adopt may have little to
teach us about how to interpret explanatory enactments in America.
That said, the specific rule makes sense, even by modern American
interpretative standards, when understood in context. Notably, the rule rests on
two cases: Dalbury & Foston and Regina v. Inhabitants of Buckingham. 240 Both
of those case concerned the same statute 241—An Act for the better Explanation
and supplying the Defects of the former Laws for the Settlement of the Poor 242—
which you might recall from Part I.A. 243 And, as discussed, that explanatory
statute was not so much an explanation of an ambiguity as the addition of detail
to resolve vagueness. 244 As Professor Plucknett recounts, equity of the statute
234. 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW *650 (6th ed. 1793).
235. See id. (citing Dalbury & Foston, Carth. 396, and Regina v. Inhabitants of Buckingham, 2
Salk. 534).
236. Id.
237. Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 22.
238. See id. at 36–78 (contrasting English institutional structures to those in America).
239. See id. at 78–105 (analyzing the ratification debates, early federal judicial practice, and
subsequent history).
240. See BACON, supra note 234.
241. See Dalbury & Foston, Carth. 396 (referring to “the explanatory Statute of W. & M.”);
Regina v. Inhabitants of Buckingham, 2 Salk. 534 (referring to “the explanatory Act 3 & 4 W. &
M.”).
242. 1691, 3 W. & M., c. 11.
243. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
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“meant only that adjustment of detail which is necessary when applying a
general rule to a specific case.” 245 The idea that equity of the statute had no place
where a specific rule was provided—as is the case in Dalbury and Regina—is
neither surprising nor supportive of a general rule of strict construction. Instead,
the rule really reduces to this: A specific, later enacted rule controls over a more
general rule. That principle remains familiar today. 246
Next, consider the historical approach to applying an explanatory gloss
placed on a legal text embodying a common law principle. In this area, we find
perhaps the most famous American explanatory enactment: the Eleventh
Amendment. 247 As Professor Pfander has explained, the Eleventh Amendment
follows the conventions of an explanatory statute, including by directing that the
“Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 248
Yet, it is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment’s adoption supports a robust
state sovereign immunity doctrine that protects states in far more cases than the
Amendment’s plain meaning strictly requires. 249 To name a few examples of
245. PLUCKNETT, supra note 33, at 334–35.
246. See, e.g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012)
(noting the “well established canon . . . ‘that the specific governs the general’”); cf., e.g., United
States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530–31 (1998) (specific policy in a later statute controls
over an older more general statute).
247. This author uses “common law” for simplicity and clarity, although the better term for the
principle that the Eleventh Amendment embodies is “general law.” See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr.
& Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 658 (2013)
(“General law was ‘an identifiable body of rules and customs developed and refined by a variety
of nations over hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of years’” that “addressed matters of
concern to more than one sovereign.”); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of
Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1565–66 (2002) (discussing the “general law” rule
that “a state could not be compelled to answer an individual’s complaint”) [hereinafter Nelson,
Sovereign Immunity]. Note that, in England, the common law included general law. See Bellia &
Clark, supra, at 658–59.
248. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see generally Pfander, supra note 6.
249. Recent thoughtful scholarship questions these developments and urges that the Eleventh
Amendment simply “means what it says” by eliminating federal judicial power only over suits filed
against states by diverse plaintiffs, subject to no waiver or abrogation. See William Baude &
Stephen E. Sachs, The Misunderstood Eleventh Amendment, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 609, 612 (2021).
That argument takes seriously the Eleventh Amendment’s role as an explanatory enactment, which
the commentators urge should be strictly construed under the interpretative rules for explanatory
statutes at the time of ratification. See id. at 634–35. This author questions whether this view
properly applies to the Eleventh Amendment, which explains a background common law doctrine.
Professors Baude and Sachs’s argument rests in part on Matthew Bacon’s Founding-era
abridgement of the law, see id. at 635 n.143, which this author has suggested may be better
understood for a more limited proposition that later, more specific statutes control over earlier,
more general ones. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text. To the extent Bacon’s canon
reflects a rule about equity of the statute, there are also good reasons to think the canon had no
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rules that find no support in the Amendment’s text, a state cannot be sued in
federal court by its own citizens; 250 a state cannot be sued in its own courts
without its consent; 251 and states can subject themselves to federal jurisdiction
by waiving their immunity. 252
We can trace this immunity doctrine back to how the Supreme Court
understood and applied the Eleventh Amendment, including in times when
explanatory statutes were far more common. First, consider two early opinions
by Chief Justice Marshall. In Cohens v. Virginia, the Court approached the
Eleventh Amendment through the framework of its genesis as a reaction to
Chisholm. 253 Thus, the Court reasoned that the Amendment was not concerned
only with “the dignity of a State,” which could still be sued by other states. 254
Instead, the Amendment’s purpose and language supported a narrower
limitation on federal jurisdiction: “it was intended for those cases, and for those
only, in which some demand against a State is made by an individual in the
Courts of the Union.” 255 A few years later, in Osborn v. Bank of United States,
the Court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment “has its full effect, if the
constitution be construed as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction
of the Court never been extended to suits brought against a State, by the citizens
of another State, or by aliens.” 256
These early cases broadly reflect the Court’s appreciation that the Eleventh
Amendment’s purpose and effect was to abrogate Chisolm from the corpus of
American law, so that future jurisdictional questions would be resolved with the
understanding that Chisholm was not a correct or instructive precedent. In that
respect, the Court recognized from the early days that the Amendment embodied
a rule broader than its terms: it protected states from claims by all individuals,
i.e., those most likely to be a state’s creditors. 257 That restated the common law
rule that pre-existed the Constitution. 258 The prevailing view at the Founding

application in America, where English equity of the statute did not necessarily survive. See, e.g.,
Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 36–105; cf., e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 851 (1824) (rejecting, in the Eleventh Amendment context, “the authority
of English decisions” on “analogous questions,” instead looking only to “the provisions . . . of the
American constitution”).
250. E.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103 n.12 (1984).
251. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
252. E.g., Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 309 (1853).
253. See 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
256. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 857–58.
257. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406–07 (1821).
258. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1602 (2009) (noting
that sovereign states were “immune from suit by individuals unless they consent”); Nelson,
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was that “states would retain their preexisting immunity unless they expressly
surrendered it in the Constitution.” 259 Chisholm viewed Article III as a surrender
of that immunity; the Eleventh Amendment rejected that view; and so it followed
that the pre-existing, general law immunity that states enjoyed before the
Republic survived ratification. 260 Note that chain of reasoning: Abrogation of a
specific error invited revisitation of an entire established view of a written
instrument’s effect. Whereas Article III was once viewed as preserving
traditional state immunity only in cases not contemplated by its text, the
Eleventh Amendment’s rejection of Chisholm led to a comprehensive rethinking
of that view and the emergence of a new rule: the general law remains intact as
it ever was.
Decades later, Hans v. Louisiana reinforced that view. 261 Confronted with
whether a state could be sued in federal court by its own citizen, the Court sought
to avoid the “anomalous result, that, in cases arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal courts by its own
citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of
other States.” 262 Hans did so by canvassing Founding-era history and identifying
debates over the scope of sovereignty surrendered under Article III. 263 The Court
concluded “that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and
forbidden by the law”—i.e., suits in which an individual haled an un-consenting
state into court—”was not contemplated by the constitution when establishing
the judicial power of the United States.” 264
When the Supreme Court decided each of these cases (Cohens, Osborn, and
Hans), explanatory statutes were known quantities and subjects of interpretative
treatises. 265 Yet, the Court never viewed itself as bound to a strict construction
limiting the Eleventh Amendment to its plain terms. Instead, the Court
approached the explanatory statute, first, by identifying the background general
law rule that informed Article III; second, by identifying the way in which
Chisholm violated that rule; and, third, by recognizing that Chisholm’s
abrogation signaled disapproval not just of the particular error (i.e., permitting
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 247, at 1565–66 (“Under background rules of general law, a state
could not be compelled to answer an individual’s complaint.”).
259. Clark, supra note 83, at 1870.
260. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813,
1871–72 (2012) (describing this argument and citing, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm
Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1577, 1582, 1586, 1687 (2009), and Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment
and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1837 (2010)).
261. 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890).
262. Id. at 10.
263. See id. at 12–14.
264. Id. at 15.
265. See, e.g., BACON, supra note 234; SEDGWICK, supra note 33, at 28–29; Pfander, supra
note 6, at 1314–15, nn.203–04 (collecting additional examples).
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suit by a citizen of another state) but of the deviation from the background rule
in general (i.e., permitting suit by any individual against any un-consenting
state). By giving that narrower construction to Article III’s judicial power, the
Court applied the Eleventh Amendment faithfully by its terms; nothing about
the Amendment called for withdrawing from the federal judicial power only
those cases within its text when properly construing Article III. 266 There is no
reason to think that this method of reasoning would be any less apt in other
contexts where an explanatory statute provides a new rule of construction to
gloss a pre-existing text with a common law background. That is especially true
if there is reason to believe that a legislature understood that this is the reasoning
courts traditionally employed in analogous contexts.
IV. A TEXTUALIST APPROACH TO FOSTA’S EXPLANATORY AMENDMENT
It remains to apply the approach sketched out in Part III to FOSTA’s Section
230 amendment. In doing so, this Article is not advocating for any one
construction of Section 230(c)(1) immunity, nor making any claims about what
rule would supply the best policy. This Article is also not aiming to provide a
comprehensive textualist analysis of Section 230(c)(1). Justice Thomas has
already sketched out the textualist case against the status quo, 267 and the
audience in this Part is not the Supreme Court, which has never interpreted
Section 230 and could therefore approach the scope of immunity on a blank
slate.
This author’s claims are much narrower and aimed at lower courts in
jurisdictions with established judicial glosses on Section 230. First, that
FOSTA’s amendment to Section 230 opens the door to rethinking Section
230(c)(1) immunity because a faithful, textualist analysis of that amendment
permits—but does not necessarily require—recalibration of the majority rule
that the immunity extends to all traditionally editorial functions. Second, that the
emergent view that FOSTA preserves only the claims explicitly enumerated in
Section 230(e)(5) has significant textual weaknesses.

266. To be sure, this author is making no claims about whether this was correct; this claim is
simply descriptive, insofar as what actually happened might inform how future courts would be
expected to replicate the earlier treatment of a similar legal texts. Compare, e.g., Lash, supra note
258, at 1677 (explaining how the Eleventh Amendment was a reaction to broad constructions of
federal power generally), with, e.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 2499 (arguing generally for a more
textual interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment).
267. See generally Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13
(2020) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari); see also, e.g., Adam Candeub, Reading Section
230 as Written, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 139 (2021) (providing a textual analysis of Section 230(c)(1)
and (c)(2)).
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FOSTA as an Invitation to Rethink Section 230 Immunity

This section begins with the affirmative case for reading FOSTA as an
invitation to rethink the scope of Section 230(c)(1) immunity. At the outset, let’s
establish where FOSTA’s amendment exists in the spectrum of discretiongranting explanatory amendments. As discussed in Part II, Section 230(c)(1) can
be classified as a type of traditional declaratory statute. 268 In response to
supposedly errant precedent (namely, the New York Stratton Oakmont
decision), Congress identified a common law rule about defamation and reduced
that rule to statute for two types of possible defendants: users and providers of
interactive computer services. 269 To be sure, by its plain language Section
230(c)(1) reaches beyond defamation in particular and common law claims in
general, 270 but it embodies a rule of decision that—in some applications—
replicates a traditional common law distinction between publishers and
distributors. 271
Against that dynamic common law backdrop, Congress enacted FOSTA as
an instruction for how to construe Section 230(c)(1). 272 And that instruction does
not stand alone; Congress called out in the text—both in the title and the
preamble—its judgment that Section 230(c)(1) has no application to a class of
claims, namely those providing redress to victims of sex trafficking. 273 Yet,
although Congress could easily have written that Section 230(c)(1) “does not”
or “shall not” apply to specific claims, it instead elected a more opened ended
directive for how to “construe[]” Section 230. 274
These semantic and social contexts situate the FOSTA amendment in that
category of explanatory statutes giving courts substantial leeway to adjust
doctrine in the face of errant precedent. 275 At bottom, Congress’s directive
translates as follows:

268. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
269. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008).
271. See supra notes 114–116 and accompanying text.
272. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) (“Nothing in this section . . . shall be construed to impair or limit—
”).
273. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
274. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). If Congress intended to spare only particular claims via a savings
clause, the most natural way would have been to say that, except for subsection (c)(2)(A), Section
230 does “not apply” to those claims. Cf., e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (Truth in Lending Act “does not
apply” to specified transactions); 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (permission to sue the United States for torts
“shall not apply” to specified claims).
275. See generally supra Part III.B.1–2.
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AS ENACTED

Websites and their users . . .

are not liable
information, . . .

for

239

third-party

“No provider or user of an interactive
computer service . . .” 276
“shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided
by another information content
provider.” 277

but in applying this rule case-bycase, the resulting doctrine . . .

“Nothing in this section (other than
subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be
construed . . .” 278

must preserve full liability for certain
claims relating to sex trafficking.

“to impair or limit” enumerated sex
trafficking claims. 279

There are several ways a court can faithfully, and textually, implement that
directive, and a few are surveyed below.
1.

The Narrow Carve Out Approach

As courts have held (and commentators have assumed), one option is to read
Section 230(e)(5) as a carve out only for the specifically enumerated sex
trafficking claims, or perhaps as exclusive of unenumerated state civil claims. 280
For reasons discussed in the next section, there are good reasons to doubt this
position. 281
2.

The Broad Carve Out Approach

Rather than view Section 230(e)(5) as an exhaustive list of preserved claims,
courts could construe Section 230(c)(1) as excluding the enumerated claims and
any other claims premised on materially similar conduct, e.g., state law civil
claims and other federal sex trafficking claims not enumerated in Section
230(e)(5). This can be accomplished by modifying the majority “rule” for
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
Id.
Id. § 230(e)(5).
Id.
See generally supra Part II.B.2.
See generally infra Part IV.B.
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Section 230(c)(1)—i.e., no liability for the “exercise of a publisher’s traditional
editorial functions” like “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content” 282—to recognize that (to slightly oversimplify) conduct evincing
knowing facilitation of sex trafficking is not a traditional editorial function, and
therefore outside the scope of Section 230(c)(1) immunity. Because this broader
carve out necessarily accounts for all sex trafficking claims that Congress
identified, adopting this approach is faithful to the text and the background
context in which Congress legislated, i.e., general hostility to the use of Section
230(c)(1) to protect websites that knowingly facilitate sex trafficking. 283
3.

The Robust Information Content Provider Approach

Section 230(c)(1) governs only the treatment of “an interactive computer
service” with regard to “information provided by another information content
provider.” 284 The rule does not apply where a website publishes its own
information. That occurs when the website “is responsible, in whole or in part,
for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet.” 285
Courts have recognized that under this “‘broad definition,’ . . . there may be
several information content providers with respect to a single item of
information (each being ‘responsible,’ at least ‘in part,’ for its ‘creation or
development’),” 286 and therefore not entitled to immunity.
To determine whether a website is an “information content provider,” courts
have traditionally asked whether it “contributes materially to the alleged
illegality of the conduct.” 287 Yet as applied, this test has protected websites for
conduct that intuitively qualifies as “development of information.” 288 One court
held immune a website that allegedly “help[ed]” third-party posters “draft or
revise” posts that were “false and harmful.” 289 Another held immune a website
that solicited potentially defamatory statements, selected and edited some for
publication, and added its own commentary, 290 even though “ordinary principles
282. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
283. See generally supra Part II.B.1.
284. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
285. Id. § 230(f)(3).
286. FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Universal
Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007), then quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(f)(3)).
287. E.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398,
413–15 (6th Cir. 2014) (same); Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d at 1199 (“[A] service provider is
‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content only if it in some way specifically
encourages development of what is offensive about the content.”).
288. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
289. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 252–53, 256–57 (4th
Cir. 2009).
290. Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 403, 410, 416.
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of law” would “treat the [website] operator and the poster as jointly contributing
to the defamation.” 291
One way to construe Section 230(c)(1) as excluding the conduct at the heart
of FOSTA’s enumerated and preserved sex trafficking claims is by applying a
more robust material contribution test. In ordinary usage, whether a party is
“responsible” for content’s “development” turns on whether the party bears
normative or moral fault for some material aspect of how the offending
information is drawn out and made usable. 292 On this view, some state courts
have already concluded—pre-FOSTA—that Backpage’s specific conduct was
sufficient to transform it from a passive, neutral forum into an information
content provider. 293 Federal courts could follow suit, rather than replicate the
First Circuit’s analysis in Backpage.com. That construction would likewise
faithfully implement Congress’s directive to construe Section 230 immunity
doctrine in a way that necessarily allows the sex trafficking claims enumerated
in FOSTA.
4.

The Responsibility-for-Content Approach

Perhaps the broadest approach to Section 230(e)(5) would use Congress’s
directive as an invitation to abandon altogether the prevailing view of Section
230(c)(1), which protects all traditional editorial functions. 294 Others have
already advanced the argument that this view was mistaken from the start. 295
One way to construe Section 230(c)(1) as not limiting or impairing the claims
listed in Section 230(e)(5), is to hold that Congress’s use of “treat[ment] as the
publisher or speaker” cannot—as a matter of natural language or history and
purpose—confer a broad immunity from claims where the law does not impute
responsibility for the “information” being published or spoken. 296
Courts already recognize that Section 230(c)(1) applies only where the
“cause of action ‘inherently requires the court to treat’” an interactive computer
service provider as a publisher or speaker of third-party content. 297 This inquiry
looks to “the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated.” 298 To
implement Congress’s explanatory directive, courts could simply carry that
logic one step further and ask whether the breach of duty arises from (1) the
291. SMOLLA, supra note 115, at § 4:86.
292. See Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d at 1198–99 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 618 (2002) and THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 742 (2d ed.
1998)).
293. See J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714, 717–18 (Wash. 2015).
294. See supra notes 124–126 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text.
296. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see also, e.g., supra notes 131–133.
297. See, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Barnes
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–02 (9th Cir. 2009)).
298. E.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).
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defendant’s own alleged misconduct or (2) the content of hosted speech. Section
230(c)(1) would apply only in the latter situation. Put differently, courts would
recalibrate Section 230(c)(1) to apply only to those situations in which a website,
or its user, is sought to be held liable for particular speech content made by a
third-party, where that speech content itself breached some duty to the plaintiff.
That doctrine easily avoids impairing or limiting claims like those that Section
230(e)(5) necessarily preserves, none of which include speech content as an
element. 299
This view is also in line with the basic interpretative approach we saw courts
take to the Eleventh Amendment. 300 Just like the Constitution carried forward a
background principle of state immunity, Section 230 embodies a common law
principle about liability for speech content that breaches duties. After misreading
the text as reaching farther than it actually did (by reading Article III as a
surrender of state immunity in Chisholm, and by reading Section 230 as covering
all traditional editorial functions in Backpage.com), an explanatory enactment
identified errant particular cases that should not fall within the initial text’s
reach. With the Eleventh Amendment, that led to the restoration of the traditional
general law rule: Individuals cannot hale un-consenting states into court. In the
Section 230 context, the same could occur by restoring the text to embrace only
the traditional common law rule: No liability for breach that arises from the
unknowing distribution of another’s speech. That limited rule necessarily
preserves liability for conduct violating the claims and charges enumerated in
Section 230(e)(5) and therefore is a faithful application of Congress’s directive
for fashioning Section 230 immunity doctrine.
* *

*

This survey of options is not exhaustive, but it gives a sense of the routes
that courts can take that would faithfully implement Congress’s directive in
FOSTA to recalibrate Section 230(c)(1) immunity so as not to cover certain sex
trafficking claims. Which option judges select will depend on individual and
contestable methodological commitments, among them views about: (1) the
relative resistance of prior precedent to intervening amendments; (2) the merits
of the prevailing, policy-driven approach to Section 230(c)(1) immunity; (3) the
proper role of non-operative text (e.g., titles and prefatory language) in
understanding and applying Congress’s directive in FOSTA; and (4) the relative
importance of social context, including FOSTA’s particular impetus as a
reaction to Backpage.com. Rather than taking a position on these commitments,
this author’s initial claim is simpler: There are several faithful, textually
grounded ways to follow Congress’s instruction in FOSTA, and some of those
ways invite substantial changes to existing Section 230 immunity doctrine.
299. See supra note 162.
300. See generally supra Part III.B.3.
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A Response to the Narrow View of FOSTA

Although this author does not take a position on which option for
implementing FOSTA is legally “correct” or the “best” policy, it is worth
addressing the merits of the option that has gained traction: the narrow carve out
view. As Part II.B.2 explained, a website scored an early win in the J.B. case by
arguing that Section 230(e)(5) is an exhaustive list of preserved sex trafficking
claims, at least with respect to state law causes of action. For several reasons,
however, this is a textually weak view that is likely inferior to other options
sketched out in Part IV.A.
1.

Considerations from Text, Context, & Structure

Part III.B argued that explanatory statutes like FOSTA should, as a general
matter, not be read and applied in a strict, rule-like way that might define
textualist approaches to other statutes. This is because instructions to construe
most naturally convey a recognition of judicial discretion in the face of a vague
underlying directive, 301 particularly where the background law being explained
simply codified a dynamic common law rule. 302 Those principles, standing
alone, invite skepticism of reading FOSTA as a rigid, exhaustive list that
necessarily precludes courts from concluding that unenumerated sex trafficking
claims fall outside of Section 230(e)(5) (and, by extension, within Section
230(c)(1)’s grant of immunity).
That skepticism is reinforced by Section 230’s and FOSTA’s other textual
features. No relevant textual presumptions support reading Section 230(e)(5) as
exhaustive. The J.B. court held otherwise in reliance on the canon, ultimately
traceable to Russello v. United States, 303 that “Congress acts intentionally and
purposely” when it “includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another [section of the same Act.]” 304 So, by enumerating certain
preserved claims, Congress excluded others. 305 But that rule is inapt; it applies
where the breadth of one word or phrase is informed by comparable words or
phrases elsewhere. 306 That is not an issue that Section 230(e)(5) presents.
Section 230(e)(5) is a list of causes of action that Congress clarified do not
conflict with Section 230(c)(1). When considering negative inferences from a
“statutory list,” 307 the “canon that expressing one item of a commonly associated

301. See generally supra Part III.B.1.
302. See generally supra Part III.B.2.
303. 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
304. See J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, LLC, No. 19-cv-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 20, 2020).
305. See id.
306. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 383, 392 (2015) (citing the rule
to distinguish the term “law” from the phrase “law, rule, or regulation”).
307. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003).
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group or series excludes another left unmentioned” can serve as “a guide.” 308
But that canon has “fallibility,” 309 and its force “depends on context.” 310 Thus,
for example, no negative inference arises from a clause that “just shows which
of two or more provisions prevails in the event of a conflict.” 311 As the Supreme
Court recently explained: “Singling out one potential conflict might suggest that
Congress thought the conflict was particularly difficult to resolve, or was quite
likely to arise,” but it “does not imply anything about other, unaddressed
conflicts, much less that they should be resolved in the opposite manner.” 312
That same logic applies to FOSTA. Section 230(e)(5) clarifies that there is
no conflict between Section 230(c)(1) and one civil claim. But the statutory text
reflects no conscious choice to impose an opposite rule for other civil sex
trafficking claims. To the contrary, Congress stated elsewhere in FOSTA that
“clarification” of Section 230 “is warranted” because it “was never intended to
provide legal protection to websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate
prostitution and websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of
unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking victims.” 313 That expression lacks any
limitation about the jurisdictional source of the rules penalizing sex trafficking.
And FOSTA’s title goes further still. 314 It provides that the explanatory statute’s
purpose is “to clarify that section 230 . . . does not prohibit the enforcement
against providers and users of interactive computer services of Federal and State
criminal and civil law relating to sexual exploitation of children or sex
trafficking.” 315 Finally, a negative inference is uniquely unwarranted because
Congress did not merely say that certain claims prevail over Section 230(c)(1);
it clarified that Section 230(c)(1) is “construed” narrowly so as not “to impair or
limit” those claims. That is, Section 230(e)(5) does more than pick a winner—it
narrows the loser.
One response to this view may be that Congress chose language of
construction only to keep Section 230(e)(5) parallel with the remaining
subparagraphs that it was joining, all of which direct how Section 230 should be
“construed.” 316 On this view, Congress’s choice of the phrase “[n]othing . . .
shall be construed to impair or limit” was stylistic, not substantive, and so should
not be overread. Textualists should find this argument unpersuasive. Even if
308. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002).
309. Id.
310. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017).
311. Id.
312. Id. (emphasis in original).
313. FOSTA §§ 2(1), (3), 132 Stat. 1253.
314. Although a title cannot control over operative text, it is a permissible textualist tool for
resolving doubts about a statute’s meaning. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias,
Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008).
315. FOSTA § 2, 132 Stat. 1253 (emphasis added).
316. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(4).
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Congress gave no special thought to the effect of using language of construction,
the object of the inquiry is what a reasonably informed observer would be
allowed to determine that Congress meant from context. 317 So, even if Congress
did not anticipate that its words would invite an open-ended judicial
recalibration of Section 230(c)(1) immunity, that is still the most natural reading
of what it actually said, both as a matter of semantics and historical practice as
informed by the remainder of the corpus juris. 318 And even if we went looking
for some supposed subjective intent, some of the best evidence points towards
broader dissatisfaction with Section 230(c)(1)’s use to defeat state law civil sex
trafficking claims. These contextual clues include FOSTA’s title, preamble, and
legislative history’s expressing discontent with cases like Backpage.com, which
dismissed both federal and state law claims under Section 230(c)(1)
immunity. 319
2.

Considerations from History & Purpose

Reading Section 230(e)(5) as an exclusive list of preserved civil sex
trafficking claims also leads to an absurd result at odds with FOSTA’s history
and purpose. When Congress enacted Section 230(e)(5), it also created a new
federal cause of action for victims of a website that “promotes or facilitates
prostitution of 5 or more persons.” 320 Under an expansive view of Section
230(c)(1), courts might hold websites immune if they “promote[] or facilitate[]
prostitution” by hosting certain advertisements or through the design of their
websites. 321 Although decisions like these were an impetus for enacting
FOSTA, 322 Congress did not include its new cause of action in Section
230(e)(5). Because interpreting Section 230(e)(5) as exhaustive “would produce
absurd results” by precluding these newly authorized claims, that reading should
be “avoided” where “alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative
purpose are available.” 323
Thus, the J.B. court was likely correct that “Congress could not have
intended,” through Section 230(e)(5), “to exclude the new civil action created as
part of the FOSTA legislation.” 324 But the answer is not to read Section
230(e)(5) as exclusive of state claims but non-exclusive of other federal claims,
the approach the J.B. court adopted. 325 Instead, Section 230(e)(5) requires a
317. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 191, at 17.
318. See generally supra Part III.B.
319. See generally supra Part II.B.
320. See FOSTA § 3(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2421A(c).
321. Cf. Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 15, 29 (1st Cir. 2016).
322. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, pt. 1, at 3–6 (2018).
323. Cf. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982).
324. J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, LLC, No. 19-cv-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 20, 2020).
325. See id.
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narrowed construction of Section 230(c)(1) that accommodates the enumerated
claims—and, by extension, materially comparable federal and state law claims
for which we have textual and contextual evidence to suspect that Congress
intended to preserve.
3.

Considerations from Drafting History

Congress’s consideration of other versions of FOSTA likewise does not
justify a negative inference. As introduced, FOSTA more explicitly saved “any
other Federal or State law that provides causes of action, restitution, or other
civil remedies to victims” of sexual exploitation and trafficking. 326 But on the
modern textualist view, “congressional inaction” on a particular proposal “lacks
persuasive significance in most circumstances.” 327 FOSTA is no exception. One
“equally tenable inference” that “may be drawn from . . . inaction” on the
original draft is “that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change.” 328 With FOSTA, for example, Congress expressed its view that Section
230 never protected the unlawful promotion and facilitation of sex trafficking. 329
Equally plausible, Congress may have viewed the initial proposal as too
imprecise: Defamation, for example, is a state law cause of action that can
“provide[] . . . civil remedies” to victims of sex trafficking, yet defamation is the
heartland of Section 230(c)(1). 330 Congress’s ultimate decision to enact
narrower language is therefore not persuasive textual evidence of an affirmative
choice to preclude other claims.
4.

Considerations from Legislative History

A final set of defenses for the view that Section 230(e)(5) is exhaustive find
their basis in FOSTA’s legislative history, and in particular the House Judiciary
Committee’s Report. 331 This Article advances a textualist approach, and one of
textualism’s defining elements is a general rejection of legislative history as a
guide insofar as one might use it to divine a subjective legislative intent. 332 In
any event, this author addresses two such legislative-history-based
considerations in abbreviated form in recognition that not all judges are
committed to all forms of textualism. 333
326. See H.R. 1865, 115th Cong., § 3(a)(2)(C) (2017).
327. Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017).
328. Cf. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
329. See FOSTA § 2(1), 132 Stat. 1253.
330. See H.R. 1865, 115th Cong., § 3(a)(2)(C) (2017); see generally supra Part II.A.1.
331. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, pt. 1 (2018).
332. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 191, at 29–37.
333. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1322 (2018)
(finding from a survey of federal appellate judges that “[n]ot one judge was willing to describe him
or herself as a textualist without qualification”).
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First, as the J.B. court observed, the “Report specifically identifies
impediments to criminal prosecutions at the state level, but does not similarly
identify such concerns with state civil suits,” and so the Report “do[es] not
clearly support [the] position that state civil claims were intended to be carved
out from [Section 230] immunity.” 334 To the extent legislative history matters,
this is the right approach: The history is not affirmative evidence that Section
230(e)(5) is exhaustive; it is simply not dispositive that Section 230(e)(5) is more
inclusive.
Second, much of my argument has proceeded from the view that FOSTA’s
Section 230 amendment is in the tradition of an explanatory statute. But what if
Congress never appreciated that? The House Report refers to the Section 230
amendment as “an explicit carve out” 335—the type of provision I have argued,
from text, that Section 230(e)(5) is not. 336 The significance of this
characterization should not be overread. As argued, a necessary consequence of
any faithful, textual reading of Section 230(e)(5) is to carve out the specifically
enumerated claims. In that sense, Section 230(e)(5) is a carve out provision. But,
the language used to achieve that carve out differs materially from the language
we would expect Congress to apply if it intended the carve out to be
exhaustive. 337
CONCLUSION
The explanatory statute may be rare, but it is not gone. Its modern successor
may not always look like the explanatory statutes of old, but the basic principle
is the same: Sometimes Congress needs to tell courts that their doctrines have
gone astray and need adjustment. When Congress directs that course correction,
it has the same prerogatives as when it legislates in any way—it can do so with
specificity, or in broad strokes. Where Congress takes the latter path and enacts
a broad directive to reformulate a doctrine—by contrast to merely supplying
semantic content to some term or stating simply that the doctrine “does not
apply” to some context—that legislative choice deserves the same attention and
significance as interpreters afford to other choices that Congress makes when
communicating its directives. In short, Congress’s choice to enact a rule of
construction matters, and a textualist approach must honor that choice and apply
the directive with due respect for Congress’s semantic directive, the background
legal context, and reasonable expectations about how courts would apply the
legislative explanation.

334. J.B. v. G6 Hospitality, LLC, No. 19-cv-07848-HSG, 2020 WL 4901196, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 20, 2020).
335. H.R. REP. NO. 115-572, pt. 1, at 9–10 (2018).
336. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
337. See id.
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These points are not merely theoretical. In the hotly debated area of Section
230 immunity, FOSTA recently provided a clear and forceful rebuke of
prevailing doctrine that allowed websites to avoid liability for their roles in
facilitating sex trafficking. That amendment bears the hallmarks of an
explanatory statute. Yet, due to a lack of appreciation for FOSTA’s text, context,
structure, purpose, and history—including the historical role of explanatory
statutes—courts and commentators have assumed that Congress’s directive is
narrow and preserves Section 230 immunity for numerous sex trafficking laws.
To be sure, FOSTA’s scope presents difficult and nuanced questions of
interpretation. But courts cannot engage with that nuance without appreciating
what explanatory statutes are and how the theory of statutory interpretation
interacts with them.

